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United States Magistrate Judge, Northern District of California. In this essay, I
speak as an individual, not as a representative of the court in which I sit. This essay is
based on an oral presentation made at the national conference on court connected ADR
that was held on April 4, 2002, in Seattle, Washington, in conjunction with the annual
meeting of the ABA's Section of Dispute Resolution. I would like to thank Robert Rack,
Jr., Roselle Wissler, Bobbie MacAdoo, Jennifer Shack, and Sharon Press for sharing data
and insights with me from material that had not been published before the conference in
April of 2002. Their generosity, of course, does not make them responsible for any of the
views expressed in the pages that follow.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The architects of the inaugural national conference on ADR in state and
federal courts crafted a series of questions to give focus and direction to the
proceedings. I have used these questions, with some adjustment in sequence,
to organize and focus the following material.
The questions are as follows: "Court ADR 25 years after Pound: have we
found a better way?" "ADR outcomes: saves what-has court ADR kept its
promise?" "Has the integration of ADR into the litigation process improved
the administration of justice?" "What has been gained?" "What has not been
gained?" "Where do the perils lurk?" "What are the primary challenges that
court ADR faces and what are the most threatening dangers on the road
ahead?"
No effort to address these questions should proceed without first paying
special tribute to Professor Frank E. A. Sander of the Harvard Law School.
Professor Sander's seminal speech a quarter of a century ago' launched the
undertakings that the national conference on court ADR was convened to
appraise. His tireless work since then is responsible for so much of what has
been gained. As so many people who work in this field fully appreciate,
Professor Sander is the spiritual father of court ADR and it will remain
forever in his debt.
II. HAVE WE FOUND A BETTER WAY?
My answer is a resounding "No." We have not found "a" better way. We
have found nothing in the singular. What we have found is in the plural. And
if what we have does not remain in the plural we will have seriously
compromised our capacity for gains.
Moreover, we contravene the spirit of ADR if we insist on "winning" -if
we insist on establishing that ADR is necessarily better than traditional
litigation. ADR is not about being better than; it is about being in addition to.
ADR is not about subtracting; it is about adding. And the perils we face will
be much more threatening if we fail to make this point clear to those who see
ADR as subtraction-especially those who see it as subtraction from the
Seventh Amendment.
I Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address at the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice
(Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 111-34 (1976).
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III. ADR OUTCOMES: SAVES WHAT? HAS COURT ADR KEPT ITS
PROMISE?
The phrasing of this question offers me several useful foils. As I will try
to make clear, the word "outcomes" is a source of many perils that court
ADR faces. Its careless use can misdirect us and can invigorate those who
challenge the programs we support.
Has court ADR kept its promise? In addressing this question, we must
begin by weaning ourselves from the suggestion that the answer necessarily
has anything to do with "savings," unless what we are talking about saving is
public trust in and respect for the system of justice.
Has there ever been just one promise of court ADR? Haven't there been
many different promises? And haven't those promises changed,
appropriately, over time?
Who are the primary promisees? The courts? Legislators and
administrators trying to protect the public fisc? Lawyers? Professional
neutrals? Or the people-especially people who need dispute resolution
services?
Let me be clear from the outset about my core views on this matter. One
of the defining beauties of court ADR is that it is not built on any one
promise, but on many different kinds of promises-promises that can and
should evolve over time. Another notion that is fundamental to court ADR is
that the parties should decide for themselves which promises are most
important to them.
As a matter of public policy, however, I believe that not all of the
promises of court ADR are equal. Instead, there are among those promises
two that are most significant. These are the promises of opportunity and of
process integrity.
At the core of every court ADR program worthy of its name is one
dominating set of messages. Through its ADR program, the court reaches out
to the parties and says: "we acknowledge you, we acknowledge your needs,
we acknowledge your entitlement to define for yourself what is most
important to you, and we acknowledge that in some circumstances the
established system of litigation serves some legitimate needs poorly. Just like
when we provide you with a trial, we cannot and do not guarantee any
particular outcome or achievement; we cannot and do not guarantee that if
you use an alternative process you will be successful, by whatever criteria
you define success. We cannot guarantee that you will save time or money.
We cannot guarantee that you will achieve a better result than you would
through litigation. Instead, the promise we make through our ADR program
is to provide you with an opportunity, an opportunity to see if some other
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way might serve you better."
To illustrate this opportunity theme, I would like to describe some
intriguing responses by litigants who were asked to compare non-binding
court-connected arbitration to jury trials and to court trials. These responses
support the notion that it is important to let the parties weigh the different
values and interests that can come into play When deciding which process to
use to attempt to resolve a particular case.
The study that generated these figures was undertaken by the Federal
Judicial Center in the late 1980S.2 The respondents were litigants and lawyers
whose cases had been assigned in the mid- 1 980s to the presumptively
mandatory, non-binding arbitration program in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California.3 I focus here on two of the
many questions in the survey. The first of these questions was: "Who do you
think would have been most likely to come up with a decision that was fair to
everyone?"'4 In response, the parties could select a judge, a jury, or an
arbitrator, or they could indicate that there would be "no difference" in the
fairness of decisions rendered by judge, jury, or arbitrator.5 The responses by





The second question, posed a little later in the survey, was: "Considering





2 BARBARA MEIERHOEFER & CARROLL SERON, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, COURT-
ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 1 (1988).
3 Id. at 3. The vast majority of the cases assigned to this program (at the time of the
study) involved either contract or tort claims with a likely judgment value of $100,000 or
less. Id. The number of parties who returned questionnaires was quite small, only about
86. Id. at 33-34. But the number of lawyers who returned questionnaires was much
larger, about 400. Id. at 19-20. With respect to the questions discussed in the text above,
there was considerable parallelism in the responses by the two groups (the only
noteworthy difference being that lawyers were somewhat more likely than parties to
believe that a judge was more likely than a jury or an arbitrator to produce a decision that
was fair to everyone). See id. at 22-29, 35-40.
4 Id. at 23, 39.
5 Id.
6Id. at 39.
7 Id. at 40.
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Responses by the lawyers in the surveyed cases followed essentially the
same pattern.8
In 1990, the Federal Judicial Center published the results of similar
surveys taken in all ten of the federal district courts that sponsored non-
binding arbitration programs in the late 1980s.? In these larger samples, the
pattern ,of responses was not substantially different, in that more parties and
more lawyers indicated that they would select arbitration as the method of
resolving their dispute than indicated they would select either a court trial or
a jury trial when they took into account cost, time, and fairness
considerations.10 The major difference between the pattern of responses in
the Northern District. of California, and the aggregate responses from all ten
districts, was that in the aggregate sample the percentage of respondents who
would select a court trial was somewhat lower (22-23%) and the percentage
who would select a jury trial was somewhat higher (17-20%)." ,
These responses suggest that while many parties and lawyers feel that a
judge is more likely than an arbitrator or a jury to deliver an outcome that is
fair to all, concerned, for many litigants and their counsel that difference in
quality of decision-making is not huge and is outweighed by the substantial
savings in cost and time that can be achieved through non-binding
arbitration. Because it is the time, money, and sense of fairness of the parties
that is primarily at stake, it is not obvious why courts should not give the
parties the opportunity to decide for themselves how to weigh, in any given
case, these sometimes-competing values.
As I mentioned above, there is a second promise of court ADR that is of
paramount importance-that is the promise of process integrity. Because the
public's trust and confidence in the courts is their most precious and essential
asset, courts that sponsor ADR programs must promise the public that those
programs will do nothing to diminish or undermine that trust and confidence,
but, instead, will enhance it. This is the promise of court ADR that is most
important and most difficult to keep. As I will discuss in subsequent sections,
the challenges of keeping this promise are the sources of some of the greatest
perils that court ADR programs face.
8 Asked who they thought was most likely to come up with a decision that was fair
to everyone, 43% of the lawyers selected a judge, 12% selected a jury, 16% selected an
arbitrator, and 29% indicated that there would be no difference. Id. at 23. When asked to
take into account costs, time, and fairness, 29% of the lawyers indicated they would
prefer to have their case decided by a judge, 12% would prefer a jury, 48% would prefer
an arbitrator, and 12% indicated that it would make no difference to them. Id. at 22.
9 See generally BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, COURT-
ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS 70-73 (1990).
10 d.
II See id.
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IV. HAS THE INTEGRATION OF ADR INTO THE LITIGATION PROCESS
IMPROVED THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE?
Has ADR really been "integrated" into the "litigation process"? Is
integration of ADR into the litigation process workable? Is it desirable?
Answers to these kinds of questions may depend in part on what kind of
ADR we are talking about 12 and on what we mean by "integration."
At a minimum, we must acknowledge that for at least some kinds of
ADR (most obviously, facilitative mediation) there are significant barriers to
some kinds of integration with the litigation process. These barriers can
include, among others, promises of confidentiality and rules that prohibit any
subsequent use or disclosure of communications made in the ADR setting. A
second source of barriers to integration is the sometimes sharp and
intentional contrast between the spirit, methods, and purposes of litigation,
on the one hand, and the spirit, methods, and purposes of certain kinds of
ADR, especially facilitative or transformative mediation, on the other. Thus,
we should acknowledge that for some kinds of ADR, the wisest policy might
be to limit integration to simply including'an ADR event in the elements of
process that precede trial.
To address some of the important questions that are implicit in the larger
query, however, I would like to reframe this integration question into a less
difficult and more productive form: "Has the addition of ADR to pretrial
processes improved the administration of justice"?
Before responding to this refrained question, we must try to identify the
criteria we should use to identify "improvements" in the "administration of
justice." Hopefully, as we work through the issues, we will remain more
concerned about justice than administration. It is simple-minded, however, to
suggest that justice and administration are not related. So it is fair to ask,
when we try to identify the criteria for identifying "improvements," whether
we should focus primarily on efficiency values. If so, efficiency for whom?
For the courts? For lawyers? For parties? Is efficiency for one necessarily
efficiency for all? Or, when we determine what constitutes an improvement
in the administration of justice, should we also look to a broader range of
values: (1) party and lawyer feelings about fairness and about the utility of
the process (taking into account the full range of parties' values), (2) the
extent to which the process permits or encourages participation by parties
12 For example, it might be much easier to integrate early neutral evaluation into the
litigation process than facilitative or transformative mediation. The primary purpose of
some ADR processes is to enhance the efficiency, rationality, and fairness of the
litigation process, whereas the primary purpose of other kinds of ADR is to create an
environment that is as spiritually and procedurally different from litigation as possible.
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(reducing levels of alienation from the system), (3) what the process
contributes to the clarity of the parties' understanding of their situation and
their options, and (4) the parties' feelings about the system of justice and our
judicial institutions.
With respect to the last mentioned criterion, we should take into account
the impact the ADR process or program has on the inferences parties draw
about what values and concerns animate the courts as institutions. We also
should consider what effect the ADR programs have on how well served the
parties feel by the system of justice and on whether their experience in the
court system enhances or reduces their respect for and feeling of connection
with their government. Because how people feel about their governmental
institutions is so important in a democracy, when we ask whether the
addition of ADR to the pretrial menu has improved the administration of
justice, we need to give full and fair consideration to both objective and
subjective measures.
As the RAND 13 and other studies' 4 show, generating reliable objective
measurements of the aggregate effects of court ADR programs is very
difficult: There isno discernible pattern or consistency in the results of such
studies, which can vary greatly from program to program. This is hardly
surprising, given how great the differences can be between court ADR
programs and between the profiles of the dockets (kinds of cases) covered.
Some studies suggest that programs with strong quality control deliver
measurable improvements in aggregate time to disposition and in lowered
transaction costs, 15 while other studies find no evidence of aggregate
improvements in either arena. 16 The two things that are clear are that we
need to continue and to sophisticate our efforts to generate reliable empirical
assessments and that we need to remain acutely aware of the danger of
13 JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL
EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT xxxiv (1996).
14 For a recent survey of many studies, some of perceptions and attitudes, some also
of data about, among other things, effects on transaction costs and time to disposition, see
Jennifer E. Shack, Saves What? A Survey of Pace, Cost and Satisfaction Studies of
Court-Related Mediation Programs, Paper for the Mini-Conference on Court ADR 57, 58
(April 4, 2002) (Program Book for the Mini-Conference on file with author); see also
Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of Rule 114 on
Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 401, 448 (2002); Roselle L.
Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from
Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 641,701-02 (2002).
15 See, e.g., DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF
1990 5 (1997).
16 E.g., KAKALIKET AL., supra note 13, at 4.
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generalizing from the study of one program to others.
We also need to ask whether our primary concern should be with
"aggregate" results, or even with some kinds of empirical measures, if the
primary promise of court ADR is that it will create opportunities, through
respect-worthy processes, for parties to pursue ends that are appreciably
more difficult to pursue through the traditional litigation system. Would it be
wise policy to abandon an ADR program if comprehensive studies were to
demonstrate that it left aggregate time to disposition and aggregate
transaction costs about the same as they were before the program were
implemented, but that 60-80% of the parties whose cases proceeded through
the ADR program emerged with substantially greater respect for and
gratitude toward the judicial system (for reaching out to them and giving
them an array of high quality means to try to solve their problems), and that
in about half the cases the parties succeeded in using ADR to achieve ends of
real consequence to them? Shouldn't we care a lot about how individual
people who use our system of justice feel about it? If so, we should attend at
least as carefully to subjective measures of the value of ADR programs as we
do to aggregate objective assessments.
We should take heart from the fact that in studies of the programs that I
know best, the subjective data support, often strongly, a conclusion that the
addition of ADR to court services has improved (in the all-important eyes of
users) the administration of justice-regardless of the criteria we use to
define improvement. In this discussion, I will focus primarily on data from
studies of the ADR programs in the Northern District of California. I will not
attempt to survey or reconcile all the data about user perceptions that has
been collected-a task well beyond my limited resources. It is important to
emphasize, however, that when considering user perception surveys (or other
kinds of studies), we must bear in mind that there are huge variations in the
programs that have been studied. 17 The primary impression from Jennifer E.
17 Jennifer E. Shack recently reviewed as many studies of court-connected
mediation (not other forms of ADR) programs as she could locate (most, but by no means
all, in state courts). See Shack, supra note 14. The studies she examined covered
mediation programs in all kinds of settings, even including criminal proceedings and
small claims courts. Id. Not surprisingly, Ms. Shack discovered that there was a huge
range of program characteristics and variables. Id. It also is significant that the extent of
court sponsorship or involvement in or control over the mediation services the parties
received spanned a considerable range. Id.
While most participants in most of the studies reported satisfaction with the
mediation process, and the vast majority perceived the process as fair and were more
satisfied with it than with adjudication, findings about efficiency in the various studies
were mixed-both in objective measures and in perceptions. Id. Viewed collectively,
there were about as many studies in which participants believed mediation had saved
them time and money as there were in which participants believed either that mediation
[Vol 18:1 20021
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Shack's review of many studies of court-connected mediation is that reliable
generalizations across the entire field are wholly inaccessible because there is
such diversity of program character and quality and, presumably, in the
character and quality of the studies. To assess the potential value and impact
of court programs with some level of confidence, we need to focus on
specific programs whose characteristics we understand and on studies
conducted with high levels of social science professionalism. When we
consider the implications of any particular survey or set of results, we must
begin, each time, by understanding clearly the character of the particular
program and we must take great care in attempting to generalize. And when
trying to assess potential, we should attend most to studies of mature, well
run programs with effective quality control.
With these cautions understood, we can begin by focusing on subjective
assessments of efficiency values. In most of the studies that I have reviewed,
more than half of the lawyers and parties report that the referral to ADR
saved them time and money. Moreover, only relatively small percentages (5-
20%) believe that the referral increased their costs or extended disposition
time (the other respondents report no effect one way or the other).18 It is
comparably significant that in studies of ADR programs in the Northern
District of California, lawyer estimates of how much money the referral to
ADR saved are between six and ten times higher than the estimates (by the
much smaller percentage of respondents who reported a net increase in costs)
of how much money the referral added to the litigation bill.19
had not affected these measures of efficiency or had increased their costs or their time to
disposition. Id. Consistent with studies discussed more specifically in this essay,
however, it is reasonable to infer that, overall, the percentage of respondents who
believed that mediation had decreased efficiency was appreciably smaller than the
percentage who believed mediation had improved efficiency. See id.
18 This pattern is quite clear in the several studies of the programs in the Northern
District of California, the programs and the studies that I know best-and in which,
therefore, I have the most confidence. See, e.g., STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 15, at 173-
74, 192 (reporting that more than 60% of respondents believed that the referral to ADR in
the Northern District of California reduced client costs and the time to disposition, that
13% believed the referral increased costs, and that 11% believed the referral extended the
time to disposition); MEIERHOEFER & SERON, supra note 2, at 24 (reporting that 63% of
attorney respondents believed that the assignment of their case to the non-binding
arbitration track reduced their client's litigation costs and that 52% believed that
assignment to that track caused settlement discussions, to occur earlier than they
otherwise would have); see also KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 7, at 47 (reporting that in the
six federal courts studied [which did not include the Northern District of California], 54%
of the responding attorneys believed that the assignment to ADR reduced the time needed
to resolve the case, whereas only 6% believed that the referral increased the time needed
to resolve the case).
19 STIENSTRA ET AL, supra note 9, at 174, 202 (reporting that the average estimated
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Even if we use only efficiency criteria to assess value, shouldn't we be
proud of programs that the parties feel reduce their expenses and reduce the
time their problem remains unresolved in 50-70% of the cases, and that
increase cost or delay in only 5-20% of the cases? These figures represent a
ratio of perceived "addition" by ADR to perceived "subtraction" by ADR of
about 4 to 1. We should welcome any reform that is viewed as improving the
system by these measures in 50% or more of the cases-a glass half-full
being far preferable to no glass at all.
In addressing our question about whether the addition of ADR to the
elements of the court process before trial has improved the administration of
justice, we also should consider evidence that lawyers tend to give higher
marks to a court's overall approach to civil case management when ADR is
included in the mix of pretrial services than when ADR is not included in
that mix. For example, in the Federal Judicial Center's study of the ADR
Multi-Option program in the Northern District of California in the mid-
1990s, attorneys whose cases were referred to ADR were appreciably more
likely than attorneys whose cases were not referred to ADR to report that the
court's case management program decreased costs (43-26%) and expedited
disposition (55-38%).20
A similar pattern in perceptions of the efficiency of the court's overall
approach to processing civil cases was reflected in the study of an earlier
iteration of the Northern District's Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE) program
by two scholars from the law school at the University of San Francisco.
Surveying counsel whose cases were filed between mid-1988 and mid-1992,
Professors Rosenberg and Folberg found that 41% of the lawyers whose
cases were automatically assigned to the ENE program strongly agreed that
the court's overall approach to case management was efficient, while that
figure fell to 31% among lawyers whose cases were not assigned to the ENE
program.21
There is even stronger evidence that the addition of ADR to the
cost savings attributable to the referral to ADR by the 62% of the lawyers who reported a
positive effect was $43,000, while the average of the estimated cost increases by the 13%
who reported a negative effect on costs was $3,900); see also Joshua D. Rosenberg & H.
Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REv.
1487, 1492, 1496, 1499-1501 (1994) (reporting results of surveys of an earlier, less
controlled iteration of the early neutral evaluation (ENE) program in the Northern District
[data from 1988-1992], in which only a slightly higher percentage of respondents [about
40%] believed the referral to ENE resulted in reduced litigation costs than those who
believed the referral increased litigation costs [about 38%], but also reporting that the
mean estimate of amount saved was almost ten times the mean estimate of increased cost
[more than $40,000 mean savings compared to about $4,000 mean increase in costs]).
20 See STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 9, at 154, 159.
21 See Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 19, at 1503.
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traditional pretrial menu has improved the administration of justice when we
broaden our vision so that it reaches beyond efficiency values and focuses on
perceptions of fairness and of how well served the parties feel by the courts.
We begin our consideration of data in this arena by pointing out a
suggestive difference between participant perceptions of how often ADR
saved them money and time, on the one hand, and, on the other, participant
feelings about how often the costs of the referral to ADR were outweighed
by the overall benefits delivered by that referral. As I have noted above, the
most recent comprehensive studies of ADR programs in the Northern District
of California report that lawyers believe that the referral to ADR saved time
and money about 60% of the time, but they report that the overall benefits of
the referral outweigh the costs more than 80% of the time.22
The Federal Judicial Center's study of the ADR program in the Western
District of Missouri reported differences between attorneys' views about
ADR's contributions to efficiency and the overall value of the court's ADR
program that cut generally in the same direction: while 69% reported that
participation in the ADR program decreased clients' costs (only 10%
believed that participation increased those costs), and 59% reported that the
program had been "very helpful" in moving the case toward resolution
(another 25% reported it had been "somewhat helpful"), 84% of the
responding attorneys felt that the benefits of participation had outweighed
any costs. 23 These differences suggest that many lawyers and litigants feel
that they are getting something more than just cost and time efficiency out of
ADR.
2 4
This prompts us to ask: What kinds of things are included in the
22 See STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 15, at 207 (83% of attorneys reporting that the
benefits of being involved in the ADR process were greater than the costs).
23 Id. at 241, 247; see also KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 13, at 51 (While this study
failed to generate objective findings of cost or delay reduction, it reports that a majority
of the lawyers in each of the six districts felt that the ADR programs were "worthwhile in
general as well as beneficial for their individual cases.").
24 Additional support for this inference appears to be provided in Jennifer Shack's
ambitious recent review of studies of court connected ADR programs. Shack, supra note
14, at 57. Even though the number of studies reporting positive perceptions of ADR's
effect on efficiency values is about the same as the number of studies reporting
perceptions that ADR either had no effect on the efficiency of disposition or was
inefficient, Ms. Shack also reports that
the majority of participants in mediation in virtually all the programs studied were
satisfied with the process and outcome, and the vast majority perceived the
mediation process and outcome to be fair. In addition, most studies found that
mediation participants were more likely to be satisfied with the process and outcome
and to find them to be fair than those who participated in adjudication.
Id. at 58.
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"something more" that parties feel they get out of ADR programs? Research
helps us identify some of the more valued contributions. When asked to
identify ways in which ADR might have been helpful, 50% or more of the
responding attorneys in the Northern District reported that their ADR
experience had been helpful in (1) moving the parties toward settlement, (2)
clarifying or narrowing monetary differences in the case, (3) encouraging the
parties to be more realistic about their respective positions, (4) giving one or
more parties an opportunity to "tell their story," (5) providing neutral
evaluation of the case, (6) clarifying or narrowing liability issues in the case,
(7) allowing the clients to become more involved in the resolution of the
case, and (8) improving communication between the different sides in the
case.
25
The Federal Judicial Center study of attorneys' perceptions of the ways
the ADR program in the Western District of Missouri had been helpful
produced even higher levels of endorsement for similar kinds of
contributions. 26 Significantly, 72% of the responding lawyers believed that
the Early Assessment Program in that federal court "helped parties determine
whether [the] case could be resolved through [a] method other than formal
litigation." 27 Helping parties make this determination, by itself, can
constitute a major benefit-by helping litigants decide, earlier rather than
later in the pretrial life of the case, how to focus their efforts, and by reducing
the extent and duration of inter-party friction.
In addition, substantial majorities reported that the ADR program in the
Western District of Missouri contributed by (1) encouraging parties to be
more realistic about their respective positions (77%), (2) allowing the parties
to become more involved in the resolution of the case than they otherwise
would have (72%), (3) allowing counsel to better understand and evaluate the
other side's position (68%), (4) prompting early definition of the issues
(67%), (5) permitting counsel to identify the strengths and weaknesses of
their clients' cases (65%), and (6) improving communications between
opposing counsel (60%).28 Most of these kinds of contributions tend to
improve, from the litigants' perspective, the quality of justice, and it strikes
me that improving parties' feelings about the quality of justice that the court
system provides is a significant achievement.
We find additional important evidence that ADR can enhance litigants'
and lawyers' respect for the quality of justice that courts deliver when we
examine data about perceptions of fairness. Overwhelming majorities of
25 STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 15, at 204.
2 6 Id. at 215-54.
27 Id. at 238.
28 Id. at 249.
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lawyers and parties endorse the fundamental fairness of ADR processes in all
the studies I have read. For example, in the Northern District of California,
98% of attorney respondents report that the ADR processes are fair.29
Similarly, in the Western District of Missouri the Federal Judicial Center
found that 92% of the responding lawyers believed that the court's staff
neutral (who provided the vast majority of the ADR services) had "treated all
parties fairly." 30
These results are consistent with surveys that have assessed party and
lawyer feelings about the fairness of a variety of ADR programs in other
courts. 31 For example, in the Federal Judicial Center studies of non-binding
arbitration in ten district courts (1990), more than 80% of the parties and
more than 90% of the lawyers felt that the procedures in the arbitration
hearing were fair.32 In the surveys the RAND Institute for Civil Justice
conducted in the early and mid-1990s in six federal district courts, nine out
of ten lawyers felt that the ADR process was fair.33
After conducting an ambitious examination of studies of a large number
and wide variety of ADR programs, most in state courts, Jennifer Shack
found that "the vast majority [of participants surveyed] perceived the
mediation process and outcome to be fair. In addition, most studies found
that mediation participants were more likely to be satisfied with the process
and outcome and to find them to be fair[er] than those who participated in
adjudication." 34
In a similar vein, the law professors who studied the early neutral
evaluation program in the Northern District of California in the early 1990s
reported that significant percentages of the lawyers and clients who
responded to the survey believed that they had learned things through the
ENE process that led to a fairer or more appropriate disposition of the case. 35
Moreover, attorneys in cases that were assigned to the ENE program were
29 Id. at 206 (85% view the processes as "very fair" and 13% view them as
"somewhat fair").
30 d. at 238.
31 See Shack, supra note 14, at 2 ("[Iun virtually all the programs studied... the vast
majority perceived the mediation process and outcome to be fair."); see also Wissler,
supra note 14, at 661-63.
32 MEIERHOEFER, supra note 9, at 65.
33 KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 7, at 49-51 (noting, among other things, that even
though objective measures did not show improvements in cost or in time to disposition,
most of the lawyers in all six studied districts "felt that the programs are worthwhile in
general as well as beneficial for their individual cases ... [and that] [t]he vast majority of
lawyers in every program were satisfied with the ADR process itself and thought it was
handled fairly.").
34 Shack, supra note 14, at 2.
35 Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 19, at 1513-15.
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appreciably more likely than lawyers whose cases were not assigned to ENE
to feel that the -court's overall procedures were fair. While 67% of the
lawyers whose cases were assigned to the ENE track agreed strongly that the
court's procedures were fair, only 53% of those whose cases were not
assigned to ENE held that view.36
Because public confidence in the judicial system turns so much on
perceptions of fairness of process, we should be especially proud of the
ringing fairness endorsements that ADR programs have received. Given the
data described in the preceding paragraphs, it is not surprising that most
surveys reveal widespread user satisfaction with court connected ADR
programs. A few examples, from a range of programs, will suffice.
The Federal Judicial Center's study of non-binding arbitration in ten
district courts found that 84% of the responding attorneys approved of the
arbitration programs generally and of the referral of their particular case to
arbitration. 37 When a team of researchers at RAND studied ADR programs
in six federal district courts in the early and mid-1990s, they could find no
objective proof that referrals to ADR, in the aggregate, reduced cost and
delay, but they did find that more than 90% of lawyers and almost 90% of
parties endorsed those same ADR programs and that only a small percentage
of respondents in any of the six studied districts were not satisfied with the
ADR process to which they were referred. 38
Less direct, but not necessarily less significant, evidence of parties'
feelings about the value of court ADR comes from E. Allan Lind's study of
non-binding arbitration in the federal court for the Middle District of North
Carolina. 39 Sifting data from the late 1980s, Mr. Lind's analysis revealed that
litigants whose cases were assigned to the arbitration track tended to remain
in the system longer than comparably situated litigants not assigned to the
arbitration track.40 This fact suggested to Mr. Lind that parties saw the
arbitration hearing as an opportunity to get something they considered
important (something like a day in court-a hearing and a "judgment" by a
neutral) that, without the arbitration program, they would not have been able
to afford (remaining in the system to proceed through trial was too costly for
many such litigants).41 Litigants tended to view the arbitration hearing not as
a substitute for a trial (a trial was not a realistic option), but as a substitute for
36 Id. at 1503.
37 MEIERHOEFER, supra note 9, at 78-82.
38 KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 13, at 48-51.
39 E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES 44-60 (1990).
40 Id. at 42-43.
41 Id. at xvii.
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bilateral settlement negotiations. 42 And many found the arbitration hearing
much more satisfying than the settlement negotiation alternative, 43 which is
hardly surprising, given the likelihood that the lawyers would dominate the
settlement negotiations, relegating clients to either a secondary role or no
role at all. It doesn't seem rash to guess that litigants are not likely to feel
deep respect for a "system of justice" in which they sit in the hall while their
lawyer negotiates a settlement in a closed room, or one in which they sit at
home while their lawyer sits in her office negotiating settlement terms over
the phone with opposing counsel or with a claims adjuster. 44
Another instructive insight is afforded by data about the mediation
program at the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. While
40-45% of the cases in which the court's mediators provide services are
settled, a Federal Judicial Center study reported that 80% of responding
lawyers said that if the court's ADR program had not existed they would not
even have raised the issue of settlement negotiations. 45 Clients presumably
feel well-served by a system whose institutionalized initiatives reduce
substantially the likelihood that the partieswill miss opportunities to solve
their problems consensually.
Moreover, as Robert Rack, chief mediator of the Sixth Circuit, points
out, there can be real "value to the parties in just knowing a case cannot be
settled."' 46 A good lawyer and a wise client will always want to know what
their options are so they can feel centered in pursuing the course they elect.
When an ADR program helps them explore the prospects for settlement and
teaches them what terms are available by agreement, they can make much
better informed decisions. And if they elect to proceed with the litigation,
42 Id.
43 Id. at xvi-xviii. Lind concluded that
[i]n consonance with previous research, this study showed that litigants want a
forum in which their cases can be heard and that they will wait for such a forum if
one is readily available.., it would appear that an important part of what people
seek from the civil justice system, across a wide range of disputes, is an opportunity
to have their cases heard.
Id. at xviii.
44 But see E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS'
VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
CONFERENCES vii-x, 13-14, 66 (1989) (finding that more favorable party feelings about
arbitration and trial were correlated with perceptions of greater dignity and procedural
care, but not with increased opportunities for participation).
45 See Robert W. Rack, Jr., Thoughts of a Chief Circuit Mediator on Federal Court-
Annexed Mediation, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 609, 613n.19 & 621n.47 (2002)
(citing JAMES B. EAGLIN, THE PRE-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: AN EVALUATION 5 n.8 (1990)).
46 Rack, supra note 45, at 621 n.47.
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they can do so with a clearer sense that that course is the wisest for them. We
should not ignore the value of giving litigants an opportunity to develop that
sense.
We also should not lose sight of the importance of generating feelings of
respect for and gratitude toward governmental institutions. Courts promote
respect for the system of justice when they provide processes that are
perceived as fair and valuable. Courts generate gratitude when they are
perceived as providing a valuable service and as acknowledging and
servicing not just the values that are important to the governmental
institution, but also the values that are important to the people. A court ADR
program can generate gratitude that is informed by these kinds of feelings
when litigants see a court reaching out to them through ADR services, giving
them opportunities that otherwise would not be available, opportunities to try
to advance the interests that the litigants feel are most important to them.
Evidence of such gratitude has surfaced many times in letters our court
has received from lawyers and clients-letters expressly thanking the court
for providing the neutral services that enabled the parties to understand one
another better and to find common ground. Comparably significant
expressions of gratitude also have emerged from surveys of litigants. Roselle
Wissler's surveys of litigants in state courts in Ohio, for example, contain
expressions of gratitude to the courts for offering the parties opportunities to
try to come to an agreement, to reduce costs, to resolve the matter sooner and
to avoid the stresses and expenses of trial.47 The feedback from the parties
suggested their appreciation for the court meeting them half-way, for
understanding the burdens of litigation, and for offering a method for pursing
a resolution that is much more cost effective than formal litigation. These
kinds of feelings toward governmental institutions can only make our
democracy healthier.
V. WHAT ELSE HAS BEEN GAINED?
With an appreciation of these subjective assessments of the value and
fairness of court ADR programs as a base, we are positioned to broaden our
inquiry into what has been gained. One of the least noted but most significant
gains is an evolution in the judicial institution's understanding of itself, its
role, its relation to the people. Experience with ADR programs has changed,
in part, some courts' self-perception and the richness of their sense of
mission. It has led some courts to a clearer understanding of themselves as
service institutions and to a more sophisticated appreciation of the breadth of
47 Roselle L. Wissler, Evaluation of the Pilot Mediation Program in Clinton and
Stark Counties, August 1996 Through March 1997, a report prepared for the Supreme
Court of Ohio, Sept. 1997, at 7-8 (on file with author).
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the range of litigant values that court processes can and should try to serve.
The reach of these changes is uneven and incomplete across the judicial
system and even within individual courts, but its potential long-range
implications are considerable.
To illustrate these developments I will describe, in summary form, the
history of my court's understanding 48 of the purposes and orientation of its
ADR programs. In our first foray into the ADR arena, we focused on
efficiency values for modest-sized cases. When we launched the non-binding
arbitration program in 1978 our primary objective was to offer parties in
relatively straightforward cases (contract and personal injury matters) of
modest economic value ($100,000 or less) an opportunity to address the
imbalance between transaction costs and case value, while giving them
something akin to a "day in court." The goal was to provide parties with a
more streamlined, compact case development process and a meaningful
alternative to unaided settlement negotiations (trial not being an
economically realistic alternative for a large percentage of the cases in this
universe).
Several years later, when we added the early neutral evaluation (ENE)
program for a much broader range of civil cases, we at first remained focused
primarily on efficiency values (especially reducing costs), but we also sought
to expand the role of clients and to reduce the alienation clients sometimes
felt from the litigation process. We sought to enable clients to serve more
effectively as sources of common sense and economic discipline. We also
attempted to reduce client alienation rooted in not understanding the
litigation process, participating in it only at the margins, and having virtually
no power to control it. But as we gained more experience with ENE we came
to appreciate that it also could be used (and was valued) by parties to
improve the rationality of the decisions they were called upon to make by
improving databases and quality of analysis. Parties also could use ENE to
improve the fairness of the litigation process by increasing the likelihood that
they would identify and understand one another's positions on the issues that
really mattered and would have a meaningful opportunity to develop the
pertinent evidence and to explicate the controlling law.
Our ADR program began having a more profound effect on the character
of the court, and on its understanding of its mission, when we added
mediation to the process options the court sponsored. Initially, our primary
48 The phrase "my court's understanding" is not meant to imply that all of the judges
in the Northern District of California always have shared the same views (or had the
same level of knowledge) about these matters. Rather, the changing "understanding" that
I describe in the text usually has been shared at first only by a few judges (those most
active in developing the court's ADR policies) and the ADR staff-then has spread,
unevenly, to other judges and other court staff.
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purpose in adding mediation was to offer parties an opportunity to pursue in
different ways the efficiency, rationality, and party-empowerment values that
our established non-binding arbitration and ENE programs served. But over
time we began to absorb and be moved by the broader, richer spirit that has
informed much of the mediation movement. We began to see that parties in
our court could use mediation to pursue a much wider range of values than
they could pursue effectively through litigation or through our other heavily
rationalistic processes. We began to appreciate that mediation was a far
superior tool for certain kinds of communication across party lines, for
giving appropriate play to emotion, for repairing a person's sense of self, for
preserving old relationships or forging new ones, and for encouraging parties
to be more open to accepting responsibility for their present circumstances
and for how to improve them.
As important, we came to understand that offering mediation
democratized our institution in potentially profound ways because mediation
permitted, in fact actively encouraged, the parties to decide for themselves
which values were most important to them, then to use ADR to pursue those
values. Because of essential characteristics of mediation as a process, by
sponsoring its use the court was acknowledging (albeit unselfconsciously, at
first) that values other than efficiency and rationality (the values that
dominated the established litigation system and our other processes) could be
more important to some parties and that it was legitimate for such parties to
attempt to pursue those "alternative" values in the public system of justice.
Another way to conceptualize this evolution exposes additional
dimensions of the institutional changes that have accompanied the
development of the court's ADR program. When we first began developing
our ADR programs more than two decades ago we were working in a context
dominated by traditional adversarial litigation. Unlike mediation, the primary
focus of most traditional adversarial litigation is backwards looking, meaning
that the primary undertaking is to determine what the historical facts were
and then to apply the law correctly to those facts. The first ADR processes
we established, non-binding arbitration and ENE, were developed within the
context of the traditional litigation system. They offered no challenge to the
values that informed that system. They were designed, essentially, to
improve that system by giving parties tools for dealing with some of the
problems that were infecting it, especially transaction costs, delays, and the
inefficiencies and unfairness that could be occasioned by insufficient
adversarial restraint.
Then about a decade ago we began laying the groundwork for pathways
that parties could use, if they chose, to travel outside the traditional litigation
mold. The mediation processes we began offering could be focused primarily
on the future, rather than the past, and could emphasize different values and
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call for different kinds of behaviors than traditional adversarial litigation. In
these new processes, feelings could be as important as facts-and the making
of judgments about events and people could be actively discouraged so that
the participants could pursue more effectively the larger goals of repair of
persons and relationships.
So one way to conceptualize our court now is as an institution that offers
three kinds of processes (1) traditional litigation, (2) ADR processes
(arbitration, ENE, and some versions of evaluative mediation) that proceed
within the context of traditional, litigation but help parties combat some of its
limitations and problems, and (3) ADR processes (variations of facilitative
mediation) that enable and encourage parties to pursue goals and to behave in
ways that are quite different from those associated with traditional
adversarial litigation.
Thus, our ADR programs reflect an appreciation of our mission as a
court that is more complex than it was twenty years ago. This institutional
openness serves very important ends. It communicates to people that the
court defines itself fundamentally as a service institution and that its duty to
serve runs primarily to the people. This message means, among other things,
that the values and interests that ought to play a primary role in defining
court policy and programs are the values and interests of the people. Those
values and interests span a very wide range, only some of which are best
served by traditional litigation. This message also means that when
alternative processes clearly would better serve values of paramount
importance to litigants, the court has a responsibility to offer those process
alternatives. The court also has a duty to offer meaningful dispute resolution
services to the whole range of litigants and cases, not just to the parties who
can afford or the cases that can carry the economic burdens of full traditional
litigation.
By offering services in this spirit, the court reaches out to the people and
tries to meet them on their terms. When the people understand the court as
doing that, they feel respect and gratitude. With such feelings comes a richer,
more robust sense of connection to all of our democratic institutions.
I do not want to overstate the changes that have occurred in my court
over the past two decades. The institution has not undergone a radical
systemic transformation. The court does not commit equal resources to the
provision of each of the three different kinds of services. Rather, the primary
focus of the court is and quite likely will remain on traditional litigation and
the processes that supplement and improve it, rather than on processes that
are fundamentally different from it. The primary providers of ADR services
that are most different from litigation will remain in the private sector, but
the fact that courts like mine are prepared to recognize and to offer some
fundamentally different kinds of services is quite significant. It is significant
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because of the extension of our judicial institutions that this development
reflects. It is also significant as evidence of the social reach and the moral
power of the ADR movement.
The social reach of the ADR movement is reflected in another major gain
since the Pound Conference-the widespread formal recognition and broad
acceptance of ADR programs in state and federal courts. For example, every
court of appeals in the federal system, save one (the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit), has an ADR or assisted settlement program.49
At the federal district court level, the most significant recent
development was the adoption by Congress of the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998, which requires every federal trial court to "devise
and implement its own alternative dispute resolution program... to
encourage and promote the use of alternative dispute resolution in its
district.' '50 With some caveats, the Act imposes a duty on each federal trial
court to require civil litigants to consider using ADR and to provide those
litigants with at least one ADR process.51 The statute also empowers the
courts to make participation in either mediation or ENE mandatory.5 2 For
reasons I will describe in the next section, in the near term the Act may not
have a dramatic impact on the accessibility of ADR services, but its
philosophic significance is considerable. Through this statute, the legislative
and the executive branches of the federal government for the first time have
formally insisted, as a matter of national policy, that ADR be made an
integral part of the federal system ofjudicial administration.
One additional source of evidence about the reach of ADR in the federal
court system warrants mention here. At the Ninth Circuit's annual conference
of judges and lawyers in August of 2000, a poll was taken to explore views
about ADR.5 3 There were about 220 respondents from all over the western
United States, divided about evenly between judges and lawyers. 54 The
responses to three questions are particularly instructive. When asked whether
"ADR is likely to yield sufficient value to justify its use in most civil cases,"
90% of the federal judges and 95% of the lawyers said yes.5 When asked
whether the court has "any responsibility to determine whether represented
49 See Kathleen M. Scanlon, A Case for Judicial Accountability: When Courts Add a
Settlement Detour to the Traditional Appellate "Path ", 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
379, 385 (2002).
50 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2002).
51 28 U.S.C. § 652(a).
52 28 U.S.C. § 652(a)
53 The questions and the responses are on file with the author and with the Office of
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clients have had a meaningful opportunity to participate in decisions about
whether to try using ADR," 86% of the judges and 75% of the lawyers said
yes. 56 Finally, 72% of the judges and 86% of the lawyers endorsed the view
that there are circumstances in which it is "appropriate for a judge to order
the parties to participate in a non-binding ADR process (other than a
settlement conference) over a party's objection." 57 This data evidences a
remarkable level of support for ADR among -federal judges and lawyers in
the fifteen districts in the Ninth Circuit.
There has been even more extensive development of ADR in state courts.
It appears that there is at least some recognition of a role for ADR in most
state court systems-and some states have well-developed programs that
reach significant percentages of civil cases in a wide range of subject matter
categories. Florida's program, for example, delivers service to some 125,000
cases annually 58 in such diverse arenas as family law, general civil cases,
dependency cases, juvenile cases, small claims cases, in county courts of
lesser jurisdictional reach, and in the courts of appeal. Florida also has
developed an extensive "Citizen Dispute Settlement" program that reaches
into communities across the state and is open to a wide range of disputes and
neighborhood frictions. 59 Another indicator of the spread of ADR is the fact
that by 1997 "every state in the Union, with the exception of Delaware, ha[d]
adopted a mediation privilege of one sort or another." 60
These developments in federal and state courts have been paralleled by
rapid growth in interest among lawyers and other professionals in serving as
ADR neutrals (full or part-time) and in the spread of mediation skills and
attitudes into the community of litigators. Perhaps the most graphic evidence
of these gains is the growth and size of the ABA's Section of Dispute
Resolution, whose annual conference now attracts a higher percentage of
section members than any other section of the ABA.61 The dramatic
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 This estimate was provided to the author by Sharon Press, Director of the Dispute
Resolution Center in the Office of the State Courts Administrator, Tallahassee, Florida.
For a compendium of information about seventy-five dispute resolution programs (many
court-connected, some private) in California, see THE CALIFORNIA DISPUTE RESOLUTION
INST., SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA ADR PROGRAMS (2001).
59See KIMBERLY ANN KOSCH, DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER, 2001 FLORIDA
MEDIATION & ARBITRATION PROGRAMS; A COMPENDIUM (14th ed. 2001).
60 Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil:
The Intolerable Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation
Confidentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REv.
715,757.)
61 Spring Conference Provides Antidote to Potomac Fever, JUST RESOLUTIONS
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expansion over the past decade of the "neutraling" segment of the
professional population is a product not only of increased demand for ADR,
but also of the philosophic and psychological rewards that often accompany
service in a role whose purpose is to be constructive, whose mandate is to be
ethical, and whose marching orders are to encourage positive, respect-based
human interactions. Many lawyers have reported to us how energized and
elevated they feel when they switch roles from advocate to neutral and when
the only demand of their "clients" is that they try to help make things better.
These kinds of rewards help explain the one additional "gain" that I
would like to highlight. Over the course of my court's efforts to develop our
ADR program, we have made a moving discovery about the depth of the
reservoir of pro bono resources in the legal community. In our ambitious
program, lawyers who serve as volunteers, without pay, provide almost all of
the neutral services. The pool of lawyers we have trained for- this work is
more than 500 strong, and we have many more applicants who would like to
undertake our training and serve as neutrals than we can accommodate. This
outpouring of public service beggars some common cynical notions about the
profession and may be one of the most significant but overlooked positives to
accompany the ADR movement.
V1. WHAT HAS NOT BEEN GAINED, AND WHAT REMAINS TO BE
DONE?
My charge here is not to cheerlead, but to assess the current state of court
ADR as comprehensively and realistically as I can. To be true to that charge,
I must acknowledge that despite the considerable progress and the many
achievements described in the preceding sections, we have not realized many
ambitions. A great deal remains to be done. There are many challenges and
dangers on the road ahead for court ADR, and we disserve ourselves and the
values we hold dear if we do not try to identify them accurately and face
them squarely.
In this spirit, we must begin by acknowledging serious' shortfalls in the
reach of court ADR programs in most jurisdictions. My guess is that
appreciably less than half of the' civil cases filed in this country have real
access to court-sponsored ADR services. In many courts, there are entire
categories of civil matters that receive no ADR services at all. Perhaps the
most disturbing and challenging example is pro se cases.
Moreover, in many jurisdictions no parties can secure ADR services
unless they pay full market rates for a private neutral whose connection with
the court often is tenuous, at best (and over Whom the court, realistically,
(ABA SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION), May 2001, at 44.
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exercises virtually no "quality control"). The requirement of paying the
neutral a substantial fee serves as a real barrier for some litigants and triggers
difficult policy questions about why the courts offer litigation services for
free, but ADR services only at a substantial price.
We also must acknowledge that in at least some court ADR programs
there are large gaps between appearances and reality. Some programs appear
to reach large numbers of cases but in fact deliver service to small numbers
of litigants. This is especially likely.to be true in courts where referral to
ADR is contingent on initiatives taken by. individual judges.
There also can be large gaps between the ADR processes described in a
court's rules and publications and the ADR processes that parties actually
experience in their cases. We have learned, on occasion painfully, that some
neutrals we have trained sometimes deviate substantially from our process
protocols without our foreknowledge or permission. 62 We also have
discovered occasions in which neutrals have misunderstood, sometimes
fundamentally, the role they were to play or the specific characteristics of the
process they were to host. We work hard to try to control what is being done
by our neutrals under the auspices of our program, but we need to do more.
We also worry about what happens in programs where the courts do less.
Because of serious shortfalls in means to assure quality control in many
programs there likely is considerable variability in the quality of the neutral
services received in different cases.
There also is a distressing level of unevenness in ADR offerings between
different jurisdictions. There are great differences in the provision of ADR
services, for example, between the four federal district courts in California.
Litigants whose cases are venued in the Northern District have ready access
to (in fact are pressed to use) a range of ADR options and free services, while
litigants whose cases are venued in the other three federal courts in
California confront a very sparse ADR landscape.
Another example of considerable unevenness between courts in
provision of ADR services becomes apparent when we compare federal
courts of appeals with federal trial courts. As Robert Rack has pointed out,
the courts of appeals in the federal system receive considerable funding for
staff neutrals and staff neutrals provide virtually all of the ADR services in
these courts. 63 But there is virtually no funding for staff neutrals at the
district court level-where the vast majority of ADR services are provided
by private lawyers who either are compensated by the parties or serve pro
bono.64 As Mr. Rack also points out, the formulas used to determine levels of
support for Clerk's office staff to administer ADR programs in the district
62 See Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 19, at 1523-29.
63 Rack, supra note 45, at 612-13.
64 Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
courts effectively preclude hiring of staff neutrals. 65
In combination, the facts of ADR court life that are described in the
preceding paragraphs mean that our judicial system, viewed as a whole, falls
far short of providing parties with equality of access to ADR services. In
sum, there are great inequalities both in access to and in the character of
court ADR products.
We also have fallen far short of making real Professor Sander's vision of
the multi-door courthouse. 66 Many (perhaps most) court programs offer
essentially only one process-a malleable, hybrid form of mediation. Non-
binding, court-connected arbitration is in deep trouble-threatened with
extinction by under-use and under-appreciation--despite the fact that it can
offer a uniquely valuable service to litigants in at least one universe of
cases. 67 Non-binding court sponsored arbitration also can be the most
attractive and suitable form of ADR for individual parties who have an
emotional or philosophic need for something like a day in court, who need to
65 Id. The way the formulas play out, the district courts simply receive too little
money to hire professionals to serve as the neutrals in their ADR programs.
Two of the four district courts that receive some funding for staff neutrals (Western
Missouri and Northern California) inherited budget leverage from the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990. Those two districts and one other, the Northern District of West
Virginia, were specifically mandated in the statute to engage in ADR demonstration
projects. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (2000) (Demonstration Program); see also Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 104, 104 Stat. 5090 (amended by Pub. L. No. 104-
33, § 1, 109 Stat 292; Pub. L. No. 104-317, Title VI, § 608(9), 110 Stat. 3860 (1996)).
Because that siatute self-destructed (by pre-set sunset provision) in late 1997, it can no
longer serve as a source of funding leverage for any courts. Moreover, in Northern
California professionals on the court's staff perform only a very small percentage of the
neutral services; private lawyers who have been trained in ADR roles by the court
perform the vast majority of those services pro bono. Of the two other district courts that
receive some funding for staff neutrals, one, the District of Columbia, essentially borrows
financial support from funds formally dedicated to the program for the Court of Appeals.
The district court in the District of Columbia also relies heavily on service by neutrals
from the private sector-so of all the neutral services delivered through that federal trial
court's ADR program, staff neutrals provide only a very modest percentage.
66 Sander, supra note 1, at 130-31.
67 Non-binding arbitration can be the most appropriate and useful ADR process in
cases of relatively modest size and complexity that turn in substantial measure on the
persuasive power of mutually exclusive testimony from a modest number of percipient
witnesses. In an arbitration under the rules applicable in the Northern District of
California, for example, testimony is taken under oath, can be recorded, and is subject to
cross-examination. When recorded, such testimony could be used for purposes of
impeachment in a subsequent trial de novo. All these circumstances, which are unique
among ADR processes to arbitration, can discipline the way witnesses present
information about critical factual matters to an extent that has no parallel in mediation,
ENE, or settlement conferences.
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tell their story to a neutral who will pass judgment, or who need to be able to
see the two competing stories (and the evidence supporting them) laid out
side by side in a controlled setting-a setting that permits a fair comparison
and provides a reasonable basis for an advisory judgment by an experienced
and impartial neutral. These potential benefits seem largely lost on many
lawyers and clients, who perhaps confuse non-binding court-sponsored
arbitration with binding private arbitration, which many lawyers and clients
apparently view as being accompanied by a great deal of unattractive
baggage.
What are the primary sources of the shortfalls and unevenness I have just
described? Without purporting to rank them in order of real world
importance, the following should be included on what undoubtedly would be
a longer (if comprehensive) list.
First, there are significant loopholes or limitations in some statutory or
rule-based frameworks for court-connected ADR programs. The example I
know best is the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998.68 While
appearing to mandate significant action, this statute offers federal district
courts immense flexibility in determining what kind of ADR program to
adopt and how extensive its reach will be. 69 As significant, the Act neither
authorizes nor provides any funding, neither fixes nor suggests any deadlines
for implementation, and neither offers incentives to comply nor threatens
sanctions for non-compliance. 70
The hardly surprising upshot is that there has been a wide range of
responses to the Act among district courts. Some courts have done literally or
essentially nothing, 71 some courts have "outsourced" virtually their entire
program, some courts have taken the position that they comply with the Act
simply by making their magistrate judges available to host settlement
conferences on request (at least when their other duties leave the magistrate
judges with some time for this kind of work), 72 while other courts have
68 See 28 U.S.C. § 652(b) (permitting courts to exempt from their ADR programs
entire categories of cases); 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (requiring courts to "provide" litigants
with at least one ADR process [except in exempted classes of cases], but saying nothing
about what "providing" means and offering no funds for this purpose).
69 Id. Some judges have taken the view that their court "provides" ADR services
within the meaning of this statute if it makes litigants aware of private providers and
authorizes litigants to make arrangements to retain private neutrals.
70 In some of these respects, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 was appreciably
more likely to cause federal courts to undertake significant self-examination and reform
activity. The CJRA contained some very specific directives, imposed deadlines, provided
some monetary resources and incentives, and imposed study and reporting requirements.
See former 28 U.S.C. § 482(c); 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (2000).
71 In re Atl. Pipe Co., 304 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2002).
72 It is not at all clear why Congress would have adopted this legislation if it thought
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designed and implemented significant new ADR programs.
A second source of the shortfalls and unevenness in court ADR programs
is often woefully inadequate funding-a fact that forces many courts to run
ADR programs on limited and strained budgets. That fact, in turn, creates
temptations to cut administrative corners and sometimes to take great risks
with quality control in an attempt to deliver service to a meaningful
percentage of the cases that might benefit from ADR. Over time, taking such
risks could jeopardize public confidence not only in ADR, but also in the
courts themselves.
It is not enough, however, to decry such limitations in statutory
frameworks and in funding. Instead, we must try to identify the sources of
these circumstances. What are the underlying forces that restrain the
development of support for court ADR? Pressing for answers to these
questions both exposes additional limits on what has been gained and helps
us identify perils on the road ahead.
VII. WHAT ARE THE UNDERLYING SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TO
EXPANDING COURT ADR AND OF PERILS ON THE ROAD AHEAD?
If ADR is a "movement," its penetration of our legal and political culture
remains quite uneven and, at least in some jurisdictions, fragile. Many still
remain unconverted. Why? We describe some of the reasons in the
paragraphs that follow.
One is the fact that there is a tone of "movement" about ADR that is off-
putting to some. The "movement" is accompanied in some quarters by an air
of radicalism in spirit and of ambition in claims that can inspire skepticism,
distrust, disrespect, even fear-especially among heavily rationalistic and
sometimes cynical judges, lawyers, and institutional litigants. The suggestion
that mediation could change human nature or work a fundamental re-
ordering of the structure and character of our society strikes some important
players as naive in the extreme-or conjures images of left-wing political
experiments whose stock in the world community has taken a vigorous
beating in the last two decades. A related problem is the fact that claims for
ADR by the converted, especially for mediation, have been so eclectic and
sometimes inconsistent.
These sources of skepticism have been reinforced by the failure of
empirical research to "prove" that ADR delivers many of the benefits its
proponents have promised.73 Empirical support, especially for some of the
that courts could comply simply by informing parties that they could ask for a settlement
conference with a magistrate judge and would get one if the magistrate judges had time.
73 The most famous example of a major study failing to generate empirical proof
that court ADR programs save time or money, in the aggregate, is RAND's. KAKALIK ET
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least restrained early claims about the potential of ADR, simply has not been
forthcoming. Much more work in this arena of scholarship needs to be done,
but this kind of work is very difficult, is constrained by ethical and political
considerations, 74 and is very expensive. Therefore, at least in the near term,
we cannot expect to be rescued, or buried, by definitive empirical studies.
Perhaps as important, there have been shortfalls both in consensus and in
sophistication about what criteria to use to measure the value of ADR. There
are failures in some quarters (both among supporters and among skeptics) to
appreciate the full range of contributions to the health of our society that
court ADR programs can make.
Against this backdrop, we can look more specifically at where some of
the primary perils lurk on the road ahead for court ADR. Peril number one, if
not neutralized, could be the source of many other perils. It is, ironically, a
process peril. It would be rooted in a failure to recognize, squarely, that we
have many constituencies. But it is not enough just to recognize our
important constituencies. Serious perils could arise from failures in how we
respond to that recognition. With respect to any given constituent group, we
might fail to communicate that acknowledgment, or fail to communicate it
with sufficient perceived respect. Or we might fail to listen actively and to
respond appropriately to the group, or fail to make appropriate adjustments to
address the group's concerns. If ADR is to be protected and prosper, we must
really listen and it must be clear to our constituencies that we are listening
and responding. In short, we must practice in our policy and political lives
what we preach about how to serve as neutrals in individual cases.
Having recognized this potential source of danger, I would like to
organize the next part of my discussion of the perils that court ADR faces by
focusing, seriatim, on some of our key constituencies. Of course, our single
most important constituency is the people-the parties who seek to use the
system of justice. Concern about our relationship with that constituency
should dominate, as much of this essay suggests, our program design
decisions and how we deliver our services. Having acknowledged that
fundamental fact, I will consider in the sections that follow possible sources
of peril for court ADR programs that derive from our relationships with (1)
legislators, (2) judges and judicial administrators who influence court policy
and court program funding, (3) practicing lawyers, and (4) what I will call
(with apologies to other disciplines and entities) "the Fourth Estate,"
AL., supra note 13.
74 There are political or policy barriers, for example, to conducting "controlled"
experiments with real cases and real litigants---especially in a system where the people
look to the courts to protect or secure important rights. See, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW 10 (1981).
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meaning full-time or part-time professional neutrals and other people who
are interested in becoming professional neutrals.
After considering our relationship with these constituencies, I will close
by identifying some internal sources of peril-matters about ourselves and
our program design decisions that could become sources of danger for court
ADR.
A. Sources of Peril in Our Relationships with Legislatures
We will begin by focusing on sources of peril in our relationships with
legislatures. Legislatures are a critical constituency for court ADR programs
for many reasons. They can provide or withhold sources of authority for
court programs. They can provide or withhold the funding without which
court programs could not function, and they can provide or withhold critical
protections to parties, neutrals and processes (e.g., in the form of privileges
for mediation communications and immunities for neutrals) that are
considered essential to the viability of virtually all kinds of ADR.
Among the possible perils in our relationship with legislatures, one has
emerged recently with particular vigor in California, where a significant
number of lawmakers have become very concerned about perceived abuses
by corporate America of private ADR. One target of legislative concern has
been binding private arbitration, which is viewed in some quarters as a tool
that some corporations and health maintenance organizations are trying to
use to deprive claimants of their rights under the Seventh Amendment. There
also are suspicions that arbitration is used to hide from the public not only
dangerous products, conditions, or substandard professional services, but also
possible corruption in the private neutral community. This corruption can
take the form of bias in favor of repeat corporate players who can be sources
of a flow of business to the ADR providers.
There is a risk that perceived abuses of this kind in the private sector
would unfairly contaminate the standing of all ADR in the minds of
influential lawmakers and the public. The risk of contamination is
particularly great in courts that "outsource" some or all of the ADR services
they sanction or that fail to adopt stringent conflict of interest requirements
and quality control mechanisms. The more a court depends on professional
service providers from the private sector, the greater the risk that legislators
will paint court and corporate ADR programs with the same broad brush of
suspicion.
To reduce the risk that legislative minds will blur ethically unassailable
court ADR programs with perceived corporate abuses of ADR processes it is
imperative that the court ADR community take great care to distance itself in
the minds of legislators and the public from controversial private ADR
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providers or schemes. We must be especially careful to make it clear that
ADR in court programs is not binding. We also must publicize the measures
that are built into court programs to assure the impartiality of neutrals, to
empower litigants to force the recusal of a neutral about whom they have real
concerns, and to protect litigants from abuses of ADR processes by
opponents that are more powerful.
In addition, we must be careful not to make program design decisions
that invite a mistaken inference that institutionally selfish motives animate
court ADR programs. In particular, we must resist pressures to attach
penalties to parties who proceed to trial after participating in an ADR
process. We must also be careful not to force only unpopular or nettlesome
classes of cases to participate in ADR programs. It is equally important to
refrain from sponsoring ADR processes in which the goal of securing
settlements is permitted to smother ethical principles or to displace the value
of party self-determination.
Ironically, a second peril in our relationships with legislatures is
animated by policy concerns that cut in the opposite direction. Legislatures
can generate program-distorting pressures by insisting on using only
efficiency criteria to assess the value of court ADR. Of course, pressure or
temptation to use only efficiency values to assess ADR programs also can
come from other quarters, including not only judges, but also administrators
within the judicial branch who are positioned to influence funding for court
programs. In fact, the danger posed by this limited vision of value may be
greatest when it infects the judges who are most directly able to influence
court ADR policy and practices. But we focus here primarily on legislatures
because they usually control funding for court programs and because
legislators feel so much pressure to justify how they spend tax dollars by
simplistic cost-benefit accountings.
Missing the main policy point, legislators, judges or administrators
whose interest in ADR is dominated by efficiency values are likely to focus
on only two criteria when assessing an ADR program's "success" (1)
whether it increases the rate or (2) advances the timing of dispositions by
settlement. Permitting these two criteria to dominate assessments of success
could adversely affect the character and quality of court ADR programs in
many different ways. Focusing on these efficiency criteria could result in
imposing role-distorting pressures on neutrals. Most obviously, it could cause
neutrals to feel pressure to push for settlements and to sometimes cut big
ethical comers towards that goal. In ironic contradiction of the core
philosophy of mediation, neutrals could be tempted to elevate ends over
means by, among other things, covering up significant analytical or
informational shortfalls, powering through the parties' emotional or
philosophic reluctances to settle, or choosing to ignore serious misconduct
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during the ADR process that would undermine respect for the system of
justice. 75
Permitting efficiency values to dominate assessments of court ADR
programs also could result in neutrals feeling pressure to compromise
promises of confidentiality by initiating unauthorized communications with
the assigned judge or by responding to solicitations by the judge for
information that the ADR rules put off-limits. For example, a neutral who
feels an overriding obligation to get a case settled might be tempted to
suggest to the assigned judge ways she might manipulate procedure or
substance to increase pressure on the parties to settle. The neutral might
suggest to the judge that she could make settlement more likely by
manipulating the timing of rulings on motions, access to dates for hearings or
trials, or by including asides or adjectival editorials in rulings or in comments
from the bench.
Preoccupation with using ADR to reduce caseloads can create a host of
additional perils. Courts so preoccupied could well be tempted to force more
cases or parties to use ADR than might be justified by the contribution ADR
is likely to make to the parties' interests (in the individual case). Such courts
also might be prepared to sacrifice quality control in ADR services for the
sake of increasing the quantity of cases referred, thus increasing the risk that
neutrals will not follow prescribed protocols or will perform poorly or
unethically. On the other hand, courts whose interest in ADR is dominated
by a desire to reduce trial rates might elect to limit access to ADR services to
categories of cases the court believes are most likely to settle through ADR
processes, thus threatening equality of access across the docket to ADR
services.
Preoccupation with generating settlements also might tempt courts to
permit only the most assertive lawyers or process professionals to serve as
neutrals in their ADR program, or only those who appear to have the most
clout with certain types of parties or lawyers. This kind of restriction,
whether defacto or by formal policy, would limit access to the pool of court
neutrals and limit the kinds of ADR processes that are available through the
court program.
This last kind of limitation could be especially harmful. Courts that
75 Examples of misconduct or ethical dilemmas that a neutral might encounter, but
ignore due to pressure to achieve a settlement include (1) learning in private caucus that a
lawyer or party is intentionally hiding key evidence, (2) seeing a lawyer manipulate his
own client into accepting terms that are good for the lawyer but obviously not in the
client's best interests, (3) seeing a stronger party manipulate a weaker party into
accepting settlement terms that are transparently unfair (i.e., that clearly fall far short of
the weaker party's entitlements under the law or that infringe rights of the weaker party
that the law would protect), or (4) seeing parties and counsel collude on settlement terms
that are illegal (e.g., in violation of anti-trust laws).
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permit efficiency values to drive them into offering only one kind of ADR
process, with that one being assertively evaluative, not only lose or reduce
their capacity to be responsive to a range of case-specific circumstances and
a variety of party interests and needs (both practical and psychological), they
also increase the risk of party disaffection. The more assertively evaluative
the mediation process, the more likely parties are to feel that they are being
pressured to settle. Roselle Wissler's recently published study of mediations
in personal injury cases in Ohio reports that while parties were more likely
than not to accept and appreciate assessments of the merits from the
mediator, they also were more likely to feel that they were being pressured to
settle and that the process was unfair when the mediator recommended a
particular settlement. 76
Courts that compel party participation in ADR need to be especially
sensitive to these risks. When it is an initiative by the court that lands a case
in an ADR process there is a greater risk that parties will feel that they are
under some kind of duty (to the court) to settle their case. That feeling, in
turn, can encourage resentment-and an inference that the court's real
purpose in making the referral to ADR was not to provide the parties with a
service, but to get rid of them. Inviting inferences that the courts are
institutionally selfish is not the preferred course.
Moreover, a court risks corrupting both evaluation and mediation when
it offers only one ADR process but then expects its neutrals to adjust or
manipulate the content or character of that process as they believe the
circumstances of individual cases warrant. When a neutral offers an
evaluation after caucusing separately with each side, the parties cannot know
everything that affected the formation of that evaluation. As a result, they
may have less confidence in the objectivity and reliability of the neutral's
assessment. When parties believe that the overriding purpose of the neutral's
evaluation is to lubricate the settlement process, they may fear either that the
evaluation is based simply on the neutral's guess about what settlement terms
might be acceptable (her guess about what might work) or that the evaluation
is influenced by factors that have nothing to do with the merits of the parties'
positions in the case (e.g., some sympathy for a party's predicament or
feelings).
The flip side of this concern is that a court that offers only one ADR
76 Wissler, supra note 14, at 684. Ms. Wissler found no correlation, however,
between a mediator offering an assessment of the merits of the case and the likelihood
that parties felt pressured to settle. Id. Surprisingly, she found a positive correlation
between mediators offering substantive assessments of the merits of the case or parties'
positions and their feeling that the process was fair. Id. Curiously, her data also suggest
that "[i]f the mediators kept their views of the case silent, parties felt less pressured by
the mediators to settle than if the mediators disclosed their views." Id. at 684-85.
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process risks converting mediation into something that is formless,
unpredictable and difficult to prepare for. Such a situation reduces
mediation's productivity and increases the risk that parties and lawyers will
feel that the process is unfair-because they are surprised by some turn it
takes or some element it includes or because they feel unable to prepare
adequately for something whose shape and content are so ill-defined and so
mobile.
For all the reasons set forth in the preceding paragraphs, those who
would insist on using only efficiency criteria to assess the value of ADR
programs jeopardize the courts' most precious and only necessary assets:
public confidence in the integrity of the processes the courts sponsor and
public faith in the motives that underlie the courts' actions. We must take
great care not to make program design decisions that invite parties to infer
that the courts care less about doing justice and offering valued service than
about looking out for themselves as institutions (e.g., by reducing their
workload, or off-loading kinds of cases that are especially taxing or
emotionally difficult or that are deemed "unimportant").
B. Sources of Peril From Our Relationship with Judges
Now I would like to focus on perils for court ADR that may arise more
directly from the constituency that consists of judges. Before we can interact
constructively with this extremely important constituency, we must try to
understand sources of judicial ambivalence about ADR, or even hostility
toward it. I will explore some of those sources in the paragraphs that follow.
Before turning to that task, however, it is important to emphasize that
there is no one judicial attitude toward court or private ADR. Rather, there
are many different attitudes, sometimes even within an individual judge, and
those attitudes are not set in concrete. I do not know which concerns about
ADR are most widespread or of the greatest moment (to judges generally or
as sources of peril to court ADR). Nor do I mean to suggest that any one
judge shares all of the concerns I will describe. In fact, some of these
concerns are mutually exclusive and have roots in diametrically opposed
political instincts. But each of the views I will describe is sufficiently likely
to occur to at least some judges that we must acknowledge them squarely,
take them seriously, and consider open-mindedly their validity and their
reach. We must also make changes in our programs where necessary and
reassure our critics where we can.
One additional prefatory observation is in order: we need to bear in mind
that there is a wide range of sophistication among judges in understanding of
the kinds of questions and policy issues about court ADR that we are
addressing. We must be careful not to assume too much when we discuss
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these matters with members of the third branch.
The first of the concerns that can fuel judicial inhospitality to court ADR
is fear that ADR threatens the vitality of the jury system as a critical tool of
democracy-as an essential weapon to discourage and to discipline abuse of
public or private power. There are judges who believe passionately that one
of the most powerful and essential deterrents to misbehavior in our society is
fear of the jury trial, the public exposure and humiliation it can generate, the
great transaction costs it can impose, and the huge damage awards to which it
can lead. Some judges fear that some litigants try to use ADR to keep their
misconduct out of the public eye, or to conceal dangerous products or
conditions from their victims. Other judges are afraid that ADR may be used
to reduce the opportunities the courts and the public have to develop new
legal norms or to fashion measures to meet threats to public health and
safety, to our economic health, or to individual rights. Judges who subscribe
to such views are likely to resist any change in the system of justice that
appears to threaten the frequency, visibility, or accessibility of jury trials.
The perils with roots in these concerns are greater now than they might
have been at other times because, in the federal courts at least, there is
relatively widespread awareness among policymakers that the number of jury
trials has been falling, as has the percentage of cases terminated by trial. 77
Statistics reported by the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts
indicate that while 4.3% of all civil case terminations in federal district courts
occurred during or after trial in 1990, that figure had fallen to 2.2% by the
year 2000.78 Data from the same source show that the number of trials
conducted in federal courts was 9,263 in 1990, but had decreased to 5,780 in
2000. 79
Some judges and legislators seem inclined to blame ADR for these
declines and to pit ADR against the Seventh Amendment.80 It is not at all
77 See Hope Viner Sambom, The Vanishing Trial, 88 A.B.A. J. 24 (2002).
78 L. RALPH MECHAM, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 153 app. tbl. C-4 (1990); L. RALPH MECHAM, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS;
2000 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 159 app. tbl. C-4 (2000).
79 See sources cited supra note 78. The reliability of this data is subject to some
question. The sources of the data are hundreds of different clerks in different courts-not
all of whom work with the same level of competence or with the same reporting
conventions. Some clerks or courts, for example, may have reported evidentiary hearings
as "trials," while others have not.
Interestingly, the rate of decline in jury trials over the decade of the 1990s was
appreciably less (2 1%) than the rate of decline in trials to judges (55%). Id.
80 See, e.g., William R. Wilson, Jr., In Opposition to Statutory or Local Rule
Amendments to the Seventh Amendment, i.e., In Opposition to Mandatory Arbitration In
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clear, however, that court sponsored ADR programs can be blamed, or
credited, in any appreciable measure, for the reported changes in trial rates.
To some extent, these declines probably are attributable to changes in the
profile of cases filed in federal courts over this period. During the 1990s
there was substantial growth in categories of cases that rarely proceed to
trial: prisoner petitions, reviews of determinations by the Social Security
Administration, and actions by the federal government to recover defaulted
loans. In 1990, these categories of cases accounted for 28% of the federal
civil docket (nationally), but by the year 2000 that figure had increased to
38%.81 While these changes probably do not account for the entire decline in
the incidence of trials, that decline would appear much less dramatic if the
changes in case load profile were factored in.
Another potentially significant source of downward pressure on trial
rates is the increase in transaction costs that appears to have further infected
litigation over the past decade or so. Hourly rates charged by attorneys have
increased dramatically, at least in urban areas. It is fair to assume that fees
charged by other professionals who often are used in connection with trials,
such as physicians, scientists, accountants, jury consultants, and other
experts, also have increased. And a trial is likely to be the single most
expensive event, by far, in most civil litigation. Today's clients who are cost
conscious are more likely to be deterred from going to trial by this financial
consideration than they would have been a decade ago. I would guess that the
real underlying cause of the perceived trial rate "problem" probably is the
expense of litigation-and that what ADR is doing is providing parties who
would not go to trial anyway (for financial or other reasons) with ways to
search for acceptable terms of settlement that are more satisfying and
constructive than the "old" way. 82
In addition to these considerations, we need to remind the judges and
policymakers who are concerned about the declining trial rate that no study
has generated solid empirical support for the suggestion that court ADR
Any Case, FJC DIRECTIONS, Dec. 1994, at 15, 17; G. Thomas Eisele, Differing Visions -
Differing Values: A Comment on Judge Parker's Reformation Model for Federal District
Courts, 46 SMU L. REV. 1935, 1973 (1993); see also Kim Dayton, The Myth of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IowA L. REV. 889, 952-55
(1991).
81 Compare ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES, COURTS, supra note 78, at 141-42 app. tbl. C-3, with JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS; 2000 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR,
supra note 78, at 141-42 app. tbl. C-3.
82 See Craig A. McEwen & Roselle L. Wissler, Finding Out If It Is True:
Comparing Mediation and Negotiation through Research, 2002 J. DIsP. RESOL. 131, 133
(suggesting that mediation processes can deliver value to a litigant that often is not
accessible through traditional lawyer negotiated settlement processes).
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programs have caused a general decline in trial rates. The most ambitious and
sophisticated effort in this arena that I know about was attempted pursuant to
statutory mandate 83 in the mid-i 990s by a group of researchers at RAND's
Institute for Civil Justice. While working with limited data and trying to
analyze the effects of vastly different programs, some of which underwent
change during the study period, the RAND -social scientists found no
statistically significant evidence that, in the aggregate, participation in ADR
in the six district courts produced any significant effects on time to
disposition, costs, or other measures.8 4
Despite serious questions about how real, enduring, or significant the
decline in trial rates actually has been, and the possibility that the existence
of ADR programs has had little to do with any such decline, we would err
seriously if we failed to acknowledge the reality and good faith of the
concern about this matter. We must take special care to reassure those who
are worried about the trial rate that we fully support parties' rights under the
Seventh Amendment. We also must assure them that good court ADR
programs and the preservation of those rights are fully compatible. We need
to remind our critics that the core value that animates ADR programs is party
self-determination and that that value is reflected in full respect being
accorded to a party's decision that she wants to take her case to trial.
We also need to emphasize that court ADR is not intended to serve as a
barrier or hurdle to trial. Rather, litigants can and should use ADR processes
to make access to trial more efficient by more reliably identifying the center
of the case and then focusing their discovery and motion work more
productively on that center. ADR processes can also be used to make the trial
process itself fairer by increasing the likelihood that all the really pertinent
evidence will be presented and that the parties and the court will understand
83 The Judicial Conference of the United States selected RAND's Institute of Civil
Justice to conduct the studies mandated by the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. 28
U.S.C. § 471 (2000), note 105(c); see also Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, § 105(c) 104 Stat. 5090 (1990).
84 KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 13, at 4. This empirical analysis of the six court ADR
programs, as implemented, "provided no strong statistical evidence that time to
disposition... [was] significantly affected, either positively or negatively... We have
no justification for a strong policy recommendation because we found no major program
effects, either positive or negative." Id. at 34, 40-41, 48, 50. While yielding some
evidence that the studied ADR programs increased the percentage of cases terminated by
settlement agreement, that increase appears to have been attributable, at least in
significant measure, to a decrease in the percentage of terminations by motion, and while
the samples were too small to support generalization, it appeared that participation in
ADR had no effect on trial rates in half of the studied districts. Id. at 105, 173-74, 210.
There was evidence in the other half of the districts that the percentage of cases that
ended up in trial was smaller in the group assigned to ADR than in the group not assigned
to ADR. Id. at 71, 138, 243.
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accurately all the applicable legal principles.
Moreover, parties can use ADR to determine more reliably whether trial
is necessary to achieve their ends. Through an ADR process, they can learn
more accurately what they could achieve through settlement. Thus, ADR can
teach them more clearly what the alternative to trial really is. Surely
providing this kind of valuable information to the people is not something to
be feared or discouraged. After all, it is for the benefit of the people that the
entire system of justice is supposed to operate. We live in a democracy where
our institutions are supposed to be designed to deliver maximum protection
to freedom and self-determination.
We shift focus here to the second concern among judges that can serve as
a source of ambivalence about court ADR programs. That concern is about
money, more specifically, budgets for courts. The financial resources
available to the courts to perform their traditional core functions are already
strained in many jurisdictions, and some judges and court administrators fear
that supporting good ADR programs consumes resources that the courts
simply cannot afford to divert. The assumption underlying these concerns is
that there is a fixed resource base for trial courts and that diversion of any
resources to ADR reduces the courts' ability to manage cases, conduct
hearings on motions, and to provide trials. From these premises, some judges
conclude that even though litigants may value ADR services, those services
should be provided either in the private sector or by some other public body,
at least until the courts' resources are substantially increased.
The fact that these kinds of worries are as perennial as the grass does not
make them any less real, especially in courts heavily impacted by criminal
filings. We must acknowledge resource constraints squarely and work with
judges and administrators both to try to increase funding for courts and to
keep the administrative costs of court ADR programs as low as meaningful
quality control permits. We also should encourage additional research aimed
at determining to what extent there are kinds of ADR programs that deliver
net reductions in consumption of court resources by reducing inter-party
frictions, demand for judicially hosted settlement conferences, hearings on
motions or case management interventions, or by avoiding unnecessary trials.
A very different source of judicial skepticism about the place of ADR in
courts is concern that ADR processes, especially facilitative mediation, tend
to be analytically sloppy. Some judges worry that there is considerable risk
that decisions made by lawyers and clients in these settings will be based on
unreliable data or inaccurate legal premises, or on a blurring of thinking and
emoting about matters relevant under the law and matters irrelevant under the
law. They fear all of this will increase the risk that important rights will not
be protected and legal norms will not be followed.
In a variation on this theme, some judicial critics of ADR fear that
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despite rhetoric about the ascendant value of purity of process, mediators in
fact may elevate the, importance of ends over means. Under this line of
reasoning, mediators are believed to be more concerned with achieving the
end of settlement than with protecting the moral and legal integrity of the
negotiation process. Distressingly, it is by focusing on "their" settlement
rates that many mediators measure their success and advertise their ability. 85
We found subtle but significant evidence of the kind of ego-blur that makes
some judges anxious about how well some mediators adhere to their own
avowed principles in an early version of the Rules of Conduct for Mediators
in Court-Connected Mediation Programs for Civil Cases in state courts in
California.86 The proposed Advisory Committee Comment to a rule
prohibiting promises of results in promotional materials would have read as
follows: "This rule is not intended to prohibit a mediator from making
statements about his or her overall resolution rate." 87 What is both curious
and troublesome about this comment is the suggestion that the resolutions
reached through mediations are somehow the mediator's (his or her
resolution rate), rather than the parties'. This suggestion would violate what
is supposed to be the central tenet of mediation-that it is the parties who
decide whether to settle and on what terms. If there is a- settlement, it is the
parties who achieved it, not the mediator.
Mediators are understood by many judges to subscribe passionately to a
value system that elevates the virtues of agreement, connection, and social
peace above the virtues of protecting rights or pursuing legal entitlements,
and that mediators might tend to put moral or social pressure on litigants to
accept the same value system. In so doing, a mediator would subtly make
parties feel morally inferior if they insisted too rigidly on their rights being
honored and enforced. There may even be some fear in judicial circles that
mediators, in pursuit of the values they bring to their work, have incentives to
blur analysis or to exaggerate risk when clearer analysis or more accurate
understanding of risk would make it more difficult to persuade a party to
agree to a compromise.
85 1 am not aware of ethical guidelines or rules for mediators that prohibit the
inclusion of "settlement rates" in advertising or promotional materials. See, e.g., CPR
INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS,
13, § VIII (2000) (prohibiting false or misleading claims about services, but permitting
inclusion of "settlement rates").
86 Cal. R. for Conduct for Mediators in Court-Connected Mediation Programs for
Civil Cases, Advisory Committee Comment (effective Jan. 1, 2003) (on file with author).
87 Id. This proposed provision was later withdrawn. Fortunately, this part of the
commentary was deleted before the California Judicial Council formally adopted the new
rules on April 19, 2002. The comment that was subsequently withdrawn was included in
a version of the proposed rules that was circulated for public comment in the late fall of
2001.
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Hopeflully these kinds of fears are at least exaggerated, if not entirely
misplaced. In addressing them, we should emphasize that we take
considerable pains to train mediators 'to be sensitive about and to avoid these
potential hazards. In addition, we need to teach our constituents that
mediators take great pride in being true to their craft-the central credo of
which is to value process purity over settlement outcome. Thus, the
mediators we train focus intently on following practices that are essential to
real party self-determination.
A very different kind of concern among some judges is that ADR is
intended or can be used to push certain unpopular, or highly emotional and
difficult, or politically "unimportant" categories of cases or litigants out of
courtrooms and into a second-class system of justice. This fear may be
informed by two very different kinds of suspicions. One is that judicial
proponents of ADR are lazy-that they just want to reduce their workloads
or the length of the lines of litigants waiting to be heard. A second suspicion,
informed by deeper cynicism, is that what really animates some judicial and
legislative proponents of ADR is a hidden political agenda, the ultimate goal
of which is to reduce or cut off access to our public courts by the poor, the
unsophisticated, the most vulnerable and victimized segments of our society.
Judges with these kinds of concerns may fear that by blocking access to the
courts, ADR programs would block access to the only source of public power
that people who have been politically and socially marginalized in our
society could use to protect themselves.
In responding to such concerns, we first must be vigilant to ensure that
only respect-worthy, service-oriented purposes inform the design and
administration of court ADR programs. In advocating our programs, we must
avoid the temptation to appeal to the docket-reducing interests of judges,
court administrators, and legislators. We must educate our constituencies to
understand that neither institutional selfishness nor any political agenda may
be permitted to drive court ADR programs. Instead, the purpose of our
programs always must be to deliver valued service to litigants.
We also must make clear that there is nothing "second class" about court
ADR programs and that litigants use ADR to improve the efficiency and
fairness of the administration of justice. Also, we must teach our constituents
that litigants and lawyers in overwhelming percentages do not view ADR
services as imposing senseless burdens, but welcome and endorse such
services because of the special benefits they can confer and because of the
opportunities they create to pursue interests that litigants themselves feel are
important.
An independent judicial concern at a very different level is that ADR
threatens delay or disruption of traditional litigation-that it jeopardizes
timeliness of dispositions by eroding the pressure that derives from early and
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firm trial dates. While we should acknowledge that poorly designed ADR
systems or undisciplined referrals to ADR in individual cases could have
such effects, we also must reassure judges that these are readily avoidable
problems and that there is data showing that well run programs can reduce
aggregate times to disposition. Referral orders always should fix deadlines
for completing ADR processes and set dates for follow-up case management
events. Such orders can impose tight time frames and can require the parties,
while they are committing some resources to mediation, to push forward
simultaneously with standard case development work, such as discovery and
motions.
For judges who remain concerned about the effect of a court ADR
program on aggregate (court-wide) times to disposition we should point to
the control-group study of the early assessment program in the federal district
court for the western district of Missouri. 88 That careful study, conducted by
social scientists at the Federal Judicial Center, found that cases that were
"required to participate in the program have a median age at termination of
7.0 months, while cases [in the control group] not permitted to participate
have a median age at termination of 9.7 months"-a 28% improvement
attributed entirely to that particular ADR program. 89 It also is noteworthy
that the RAND study of six very different (and still evolving) ADR programs
in the early 1990s found that, in the aggregate, the ADR programs had no
negative effect on time to disposition.90
There is one additional source of judicial ambivalence about (or,
sometimes, hostility toward) court ADR programs that I would like to
describe. The act of articulating these sentiments risks doing them injustice
by over-simplifying and exaggerating them or by abstracting them from the
complex emotional and philosophic context in which they exist, a context
that can color their content and reduce their intensity. But the kinds of
sentiments and attitudes that I will describe in the next paragraph can be real
players in our environment and can be strongly felt, even though they
sometimes are articulated only obliquely or not at all.
The gist of these feelings is that court ADR programs threaten both to
88 ST1ENSTRA ET AL., supra note 15, at 215.
89 Id.
90 KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 7, at xxx.
We have no strong statistical evidence that time to disposition is significantly
affected by mediation or neutral evaluation in any of the six programs studied. There
was no statistically significant difference in the time to disposition between the ADR
sample cases and the comparison cases in five of the six ADR programs.
Id. The researchers inferred that the longer times in the sixth district were attributable to
the fact that the judges there tended to refer to the ADR program the cases that they
believed would be more difficult to settle. See id.
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alter the role of the judge and to erode her importance in our system of
government. Squarely acknowledged, these notions would take the following
shape: "ADR threatens to change the character of my institution and of my
job; it threatens to demand behaviors from me that I do not want to provide
or would be no good at. ADR threatens to reduce my importance-to take
cases and headlines away from me. ADR threatens to reduce the number of
occasions on which I can exercise my power. ADR is, at its core, a criticism
and denigration of the centuries old system in which I have flourished and at
the top of which I sit."
I have no idea how common feelings like these are, but where they exist
they can be real and raw, and they can fuel a deeply rooted, even if not fully
self-aware, opposition to court sponsorship of ADR programs. Appropriate
responses could include reassurances that our goal is not to radically change
the character of judicial institutions or the kind of work most judges spend
most of their time doing. Instead, the goal is to supplement the core services
courts long have provided and to add to those services rather than to displace
or subtract from them. We also need to make it clear how much we respect
the hallmark features of the civil adjudicatory system and the jury trial in
particular, and how completely we agree that the preservation and
strengthening of that system is essential to the long range health of our
society. There will always be a place for litigation-a big, central,
indispensable place. One of our goals is to help make sure that the societal
resource that our civil adjudicatory system constitutes is well used and really
is available when it is needed to perform the critical functions only it can
perform.
C. Sources of Peril From Our Relationships with Practicing Lawyers
Lawyers have been indispensable sources of support and service in a
great many court ADR programs. Many court ADR programs exist today
only because of initiatives taken and hard work performed by lawyers. In
some courts, the judges have agreed to adopt ADR programs only after and
because leaders of the bar have urged them to do so. Lawyers are credited
with inventing and promoting, first in the private sector, several of the types
of ADR processes that have been incorporated into court programs. So we
must never forget that a great many lawyers have been our leaders and our
allies over the quarter century since the Pound Conference.
We also need to acknowledge, however, that not all lawyers understand
or accept ADR and that we could jeopardize court ADR programs if we do
not appreciate sources of peril in our relationship with counsel. Lawyers
could undermine or sabotage court ADR programs by failing to inform
clients that they have ADR options, failing to accurately consider the pros
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and cons of those options with their clients, or by actively discouraging their
clients from trying to use ADR or from participating in good faith in ADR
events. Lawyers also may undermine ADR programs, more subtlety but no
less significantly, by failing to take full advantage of the potential in an ADR
proceeding when they prepare for and attend it. Sometimes failings of these
kinds are attributable to ignorance, sometimes to inertia, sometimes to fear of
unfamiliar processes and fora, of loss of control over inputs to and from the
client, and sometimes to greed.
Good court ADR programs must attack ignorance, inertia, and fear by (1)
educating lawyers9' and client groups, (2) building into the ADR and case
management program a series of incentives and pressures to give real and
fair consideration in each civil case to the use of ADR (with full inputs to and
from clients), and (3) establishing and publicizing tight quality control
mechanisms aimed, in part, at reducing lawyers' fear that the neutral will not
be competent or will displace them or invade their relationship with their
client.
What about lawyers who permit self-interest to compromise their
loyalties to their clients? Many successful lawyers would argue, of course,
that the dichotomy posed in this question is false, that there is no difference
between being client-oriented and being self-oriented, between client interest
and self-interest. They would contend that the more intelligently client-
oriented lawyers are, the more business success they enjoy. But even for
lawyers who view such notions with cynicism there can be at least some
convergence in ADR programs between their personal interests and the
interests of their clients (and of the courts).
As sophisticated lawyers understand, it can be very profitable to
incorporate active use of ADR opportunities into a broader litigation strategy
or a more comprehensive system for addressing client needs. The goal of
such lawyers is not necessarily to make more money in any particular case, 92
but to increase the overall volume and quality of work they attract. The story
goes as follows. Not all the time, but many times, ADR processes increase
clients' understanding of their situation, and make them feel that they have
reliably identified their options. It reduces their fear that they are missing
undiscovered opportunities or making decisions on the basis of guesses in
which they have no real confidence. ADR processes also reduce clients'
transaction costs, produce agreements that otherwise would not be accessible,
and enhance their satisfaction with both the terms of disposition and the
91 Education of lawyers will be especially effective if it is conducted by visibly
successful lawyers and by judges who are highly respected and viewed as worldly and
practical.
92 Although creative lawyers sometimes negotiate compensation incentives for early
dispositions.
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process leading to it. Happy clients are more likely to be happy with their
lawyers. Clients who are happy with their lawyers are likely to use those
same lawyers again and are likely to refer additional clients. All this means
more business for the lawyer who has used ADR to the benefit of his clients.
There is another important way that ADR processes can serve personal
interests of lawyers. Being involved in ADR processes can improve the
quality of a lawyer's professional life and make the lawyer feel better about
being a lawyer. It can be very satisfying to help clients explore prospects for
settlement earlier and more reliably, to enhance the efficiency and rationality
of dispute processing, and to improve the interpersonal dynamics that attend
negotiation and litigation. Sour or friction-riddled dynamics between lawyers
are major sources of professional dissatisfaction among litigators. Moreover,
client disappointment in or misunderstanding of a lawyer's work can be a
source of frustration and loss of income-and of malpractice actions. ADR,
intelligently used, can reduce the risk of client disaffection with counsel's
work and can make the day-to-day dynamics in which lawyers make their
living much more pleasant.
It also can be useful to remind lawyers that they need not fear that using
ADR will make them any less effective protectors of their clients' rights or
less vigorous pursuers of their clients' interests. We need to make sure that
counsel understand that there are a wide range of ADR processes and that
some of these processes focus primarily on evidence and law. We also need
to teach lawyers that even participation in ADR processes like facilitative
mediation-processes that can reach into arenas beyond law and evidence-
need not compromise counsel's ability to accomplish what his client hired
him to do. Being firm, resolute, and analytically sharp are not mutually
exclusive with being courteous, thoughtful, and intellectually open. Agreeing
to participate in a mediation is not tantamount to agreeing to compromise
important interests or to replace keen, self-interested analysis with a soft,
affect dominated interpersonal exercise. By agreeing to participate in
mediation, neither lawyer nor client agrees to give up anything. Rather,
lawyer and client merely agree to try using an additional process tool to
search for what is best for the client. Mediations are designed to help parties
understand more clearly what their own underlying interests are and to help
parties use their own squarely identified values to prioritize those interests. A
good lawyer, a lawyer who wants to energetically do as much for his client as
the circumstances permit, embraces the use of tools that help him and his
client more reliably and comprehensively understand both their own situation
and their options for going forward.
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D. Sources of Peril in Our Relationships with the Fourth Estate
As indicated earlier, I use the phrase "fourth estate" here to refer to
lawyers and others who make or want to make some or all of their living by
serving as ADR neutrals. Outside the world of organized labor relations, this
group certainly was nothing approaching an "estate" at the time of the Pound
Conference. Over the past fifteen years, however, that has changed.
I use the phrase "estate" because it suggests a group of size, force, and
apparent longevity-an institutional player of significance. We need to
acknowledge that this estate exists and that ADR neutrals have emerged as
players of policy and political significance. We need to attend to our
relationship with this group.
At the outset, it is important to point out that the fourth estate is hardly a
monolith. It is, rather, a complex and loose aggregation of sub-groups
between which there can be considerable differences of policy view and
interests. Different sub-groups of this estate can have different kinds of
tensions with or concerns about the courts and their ADR programs. One
subset might worry most about the courts corrupting mediation. Another
subset might worry most about the courts preempting the field, while another
might worry most about the courts adopting policies (about confidentiality,
compensation, or conflicts of interest) that could threaten the vitality or
integrity of private ADR, especially private mediation.
But even though the fourth estate is complex and internally fragmented,
it has demonstrated an ability to organize itself for some purposes into a
powerful lobby. This lobby can affect public policy in arenas that can have
considerable impact on judicial institutions and processes. For example, this
estate can affect legislation conferring privileges or other confidentiality
protections on people who participate in mediation.
The most important reasons for attending to our relationship with the
fourth estate, however, are that it and the courts have much more in common
than not in common, and members of this estate can be significant sources of
learning and service for judicial institutions. Working synergistically, courts
and the fourth estate can do much good. It follows that we must work to
reassure the private ADR provider community that the courts have no
ambition or capacity to preempt or dominate the ADR field. The policies that
we adopt for court ADR programs about such sensitive matters as
compensation and confidentiality are not aimed at undermining demand for
or limiting the character of ADR in the private sector. Instead, they are
rooted necessarily in sensitivities that are unique to the roles courts play as
institutions of government in our democratic system.
To make our interaction with the fourth estate as thoughtful and
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constructive as possible, however, we need to understand sources of potential
tension between courts and the private ADR provider community. As
explained in the paragraphs that follow, there will not always be perfect
interest alignment between the courts and at least some subsets of private
neutrals.
In lobbying legislatures and filing amicus briefs in litigation,
organizations of neutrals (primarily mediators) believe that they are trying to
protect the integrity and viability of the mediation process itself-as a value
that is independent of the courts as institutions and of individual parties. In
fact, some mediators would contend that the value of mediation derives
primarily from the degree of separation, the degree of difference, between
mediation and the judicial process. Some mediators believe that mediation as
a process holds vastly greater social promise than the judicial process. Some
believe that it has the potential and the power to literally transform, not only
the dynamic through which individual disputes are resolved, but also the
character of the parties to the disputes, of their value priorities and their most
fundamental orientations.
In this vision, mediation as a process holds the promise of transforming
our society, even of transforming human nature. Indeed, in its most
ambitious proponents, this vision may even reject the concept of "human
nature," at least to the extent that that phrase suggests that "nature" (as
primitively understood) need play a dominant role in human interactions and
institutions.
But even mediators who are less sanguine about the transformative
potential of mediation are likely to believe that preserving its vitality is a
matter of great importance that is in substantial measure independent of
society's interest in preserving the integrity and vitality of judicial
institutions. Further, some mediators would take the position that there is so
much social value in promoting mediation as a process that if an
irreconcilable conflict arises between the values critical to mediation and the
values critical to the court system (at least on the civil side), or even values
critical to the parties to a particular mediation, the court system and the
parties must yield.
Tensions of these kinds surfaced in two recent cases in California,
Rinaker v. Superior Court,93 and Olam v. Congress Mortgage.94 In Rinaker,
a teenager was accused in a juvenile court proceeding of conduct that would
93 Rinaker v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
94 Olam v. Congress Mortgage, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999). For a very
different example of a court struggling to resolve tensions between evidentiary needs and
the mediation privilege, see Rojas v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
[Vol 18:1 20021
COURT ADR 25 YEARS AFTER POUND
be deemed criminal if he had been an adult.95 He believed that his accuser in
the juvenile court had made admissions during an earlier mediation that
would help exonerate him.96 When he subpoenaed the mediator, Ms.
Rinaker, to testify, she vigorously resisted, invoking protections and
prohibitions on disclosure of mediation communications that had been
enacted by the state legislature after successful lobbying by organizations of
private mediators.97 Ms. Rinaker took the position, as a matter of sincere
principle, that her protections under the statutes were absolute and that the
juvenile court defendant's interests could not be sufficient to outweigh what
she viewed as the more compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the
mediation process. 98
The California Court of Appeals respectfully disagreed, holding that, if
necessary, a mediator's statutorily rooted privilege against being compelled
to disclose confidential mediation communications can be trumped (even in a
nominally civil proceeding) by the constitutional rights of a defendant under
the confrontation and due process clauses.99 The court so held even though
the applicable statutes did not recognize an exception in the situation the
Rinaker court faced.
The conflict between the views of the mediator and the views of the
court in Rinaker was stark. The mediator believed passionately that not even
a demonstrable need to preserve fundamental constitutional rights should be
permitted to jeopardize the sanctity of mediation confidentiality, and thus to
jeopardize (in her view) both the philosophic core and the practical viability
of mediation as a distinct process. On the other hand, the court's response to
the dilemma it faced evidences acute judicial sensitivity to the singular and
immensely important role of the courts to serve as the primary source of
protection of fundamental (in the constitutional sense) civil rights, especially
rights subject to abuse or invasion by majorities acting (through legislation
sometimes actually secured by a special interest group) at the expense of
minorities.
Another force likely at play in Rinaker was the court's passion for
protecting the constitutional integrity of its own processes. In this case, the
rights that were pitted against the mediator's interest in not breaching
confidentiality promises were rights directly bound up in and critical to the
fairness of the judicial process. Unlike mediators, courts exercise the
immense power of the state. Sensitive to the responsibility that attends
exercise of power, and of the moral duties that arise from the capacity to
95 Rinaker, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 162.
96 Id.
9 7 Id. at 163.
98 Id. at 165.
99 Id.
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compel radical changes in the circumstances of the people who come through
the judicial system, judges are deeply committed to doing everything they
can to make sure that they exercise power justly and in strict accordance with
the law. They also commit to ensuring that the processes over which they
preside are fair, and that the public perceives and believes in the
thoroughgoing fairness of the procedures and rules through which their
courts can force changes on them. Ultimately, what is at stake here is nothing
less than the public's confidence in our democratic form of government-
because it is that government's power that the courts wield.
Shades of a similar kind of confrontation are visible in Olam v. Congress
Mortgage.0 ° Unlike the Rinaker case, the issues in Olam, where there were
no criminal law undertones, did not implicate the confrontation clause. Nor
did the Olam court reach arguments that might have been raised under the
due process clause. But like Rinaker, the situation in Olam triggered a direct
conflict between values dear to the mediation community and values dear to
the courts. On one side was the mediators' interest in not being compelled to
breach confidentiality promises, and the mediators' belief (legislatively
supported) that being so compelled posed a grave threat to mediation
generally. On the other side were substantive legal rights of great
consequence to parties who had turned to the court to protect those rights, the
court's capacity to perform its institutional function, and a threat to public
confidence in how courts exercise the power of our government.
Ms. Olam was the plaintiff in the underlying case.10' She was a single
woman in her mid-60s with demonstrable health problems, some instability
of judgment, no job and limited resources. 10 2 The defendant was a mortgage
brokerage company from which Ms. Olam had borrowed money in the early
1990s.103 She had defaulted on her payments, and several attempts to resolve
the matter by agreement had failed. 104
Ms. Olam had a very poor relationship with her lawyer, who had failed
to file important papers for the final pretrial conference, exposing Ms. Olam
to the prospect of a trial in which only documentary evidence submitted by
her opponent would be admitted. 10 5 At stake in the trial were Ms. Olam's
only assets and her primary sources of support-equity in two modest
100 Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1113. The purpose of the discussion of Olam in the text
is not to defend its reasoning or holding, both of which have been the objects of
thoughtful and sometimes telling criticism, but to explicate tensions that can arise
between the judicial community and the mediation community.
101 Id.
102Id. at 1118.
103 Id. at 1113.
104 Id. at 1113-14.
105 Id. at 1116.
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properties, one of which was her residence. 0 6
In this setting, with encouragement from the court, the parties
participated in a mediation one week before trial would commence, with no
prospect of a continuance.10 7 The mediation was hosted, at the court's
request, by the Program Counsel to the court's ADR program, who was an
employee of the court and one of the two professionals on staff most
responsible for the design and implementation of the court's ADR
program. 10 8 The mediation began in the morning and continued, without
substantial interruption, until I a.m. the next morning, when, teary-eyed, Ms.
Olam agreed to sign a settlement agreement.109 .
Under the terms of that agreement she gave up all her claims against the
defendants and all her rights to damages, received no money, would lose
immediately one of the two properties in which she had an interest, and
would face a payment schedule that would make it difficult, at a minimum, to
keep the other property. " 0 So, the terms of the agreement created a real risk
that she would lose all her property and would be unable to support herself
even at a very modest level. To repeat, this agreement was reached at the end
of a 14-hour process hosted by a court employee-an employee whom the
public might reasonably fear was animated in some measure by a desire to
please the court by orchestrating a settlement.
Ms. Olam arrived home about 1:30 a.m. III Around 10:00 a.m. that same
day she called the judge's chambers, apparently feeling considerable stress
about what had happened during the mediation.112 The judge declined to
speak with her."13 Subsequently, she refused to sign a formalized settlement
contract.1 14 Additional efforts to settle were undertaken, but to no avail.' 15
She fired her lawyer. 16 Defendants then filed a motion to enforce the terms
of the agreement the parties had signed at the end of the mediation. 117
In response, Ms. Olam contended that she could not be bound by the
terms to which she had subscribed her name because at the time she signed
the document (the document that the court's mediator had played a major
106 Id. at 1142-43.
10 7 Id. at 1116.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1117.
'10 Id. at 1147 n. 61.





116 Id. at 1118.
117 Id. at 1113.
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role in drafting) she was incapacitated by her emotional and physical state,
and by the stress of her situation, from exercising meaningful freedom of will
and from making any legally competent commitments. 11 8 She contended that
her lawyer had done virtually nothing to assist or protect her in this
setting. 119 She also emphasized that her lawyer's failures to comply with
pretrial rules both had created the prospect of a completely unfair trial and
had given her lawyer a keen incentive to pressure her to agree to a settlement
(rather than go through a trial a week later saddled with such huge
evidentiary disabilities and then face the prospect of a malpractice action). 120
It was in this setting that the defendants were demanding that the court
use the power of the state to force an older, partially incapacitated woman to
adhere to settlement terms that could well leave her destitute. Is it remarkable
that the court was deeply concerned both about doing the right thing, under
the law, and about using procedures that would encourage the public to
believe that the court was doing the right thing?
As the hearings on the motion to enforce the agreement unfolded, both
Ms. Olam and the brokerage defendants decided that they wanted the
mediator to testify about what happened during the mediation. 121 Both
parties apparently felt that that testimony would be critical to their ability to
secure their rights. The mediator declined to agree to testify and, on the
court's active invitation, invoked his protections under California statutes
which appeared to confer on mediators absolute protection (except in
circumstances not implicated here) against being compelled to testify about
mediation communications. 122
In addressing this problem, the Olam court attempted to follow principles
it drew from Rinaker. Trying to apply these principles in this different
setting, the court concluded that it was permissible under California law to
compel the mediator to testify-despite the fact that (as in Rinaker) the
language of the applicable statutes did not recognize an exception for the
kind of circumstance the Olam court faced. In construing the legislation to
permit the court to compel the mediator to testify, the court in Olam
emphasized that that testimony was essential to doing substantive and
procedural justice and to being perceived by the public as so doing, that the
integrity of the court and its ADR program were under direct attack, and that
all the participants in the mediation (except the neutral) wanted the mediator
118 Id. at 1118.
1191d.
120 Id. at 1143-44
121 Id. at 1129.
122Id. at 1130.
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to testify and waived their own privileges and protections. 123
Vocal segments of the mediation community took strong exception to
both the holding and the reasoning in Olam, in part on the ground that by
judicially carving out an exception to the mediator's privilege in these
circumstances the court was creating a serious threat to party confidence,
generally, in the promise of mediation confidentiality. A threat to that
confidence, the critics urged, created a serious threat to party willingness to
use mediation at all.
The point here, of course, is not whether Olam correctly or incorrectly
understood and applied California law.124 Rather, the point of this discussion
of Olam is to show that occasionally there can be tensions between the
mediation community and the courts that implicate, directly, values and
interests of great significance to both. It is important to the health of ADR to
recognize that fact and then to engage in mutually respectful, thoughtful
discussion of the issues raised on such occasions. During such discussions,
however, it is critical to keep clearly in mind how much courts and the
mediation community have in common-how many values and interests they
share, and how often their purposes and philosophies are in harmony and
synergistic.
There is one additional policy arena of potential tension between court
ADR programs and the private ADR provider community: that warrants
mention here: compensation for neutrals. Some courts and parties will want
neutrals to work at economy rates, or pro bono, while organizations of
neutrals are likely to press for payment at professionals' market rates
(agreeing to perform only limited work for free as a public service). While
lobbying for higher levels of compensation may be vulnerable to cynical
inferences about self-interest, organized mediators would contend that their
real purpose is to protect against compromising the quality of mediator
services. They would argue that if neutrals are not paid at market rates, the
quality of neutrals will suffer, or the quality of the effort that neutrals are
willing to commit to individual cases will suffer, thus harming the integrity
and viability of mediation generally.
Courts must strike an appropriate balance in this arena between
permitting the views and interests of private providers to dictate public
123 Id. at 1138-39.
124 Because a federal court issued it, the Olam opinion could make no authoritative
pronouncement about the meaning of California law.
No California court has subsequently addressed the issues that the Olam court
confronted. In Foxgate Homeowners' Ass 'n, Inc., v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., the California
Supreme Court discussed Rinaker with apparent approval and then described Olam,
without clear expression of either approval or disapproval. Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n,
Inc., v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 1, 15-16 (Cal. 2001).
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policy, on the one hand, and, on the other, compromising the quality of the
processes courts offer or jeopardizing the viability of the private provider
market, in whose robust health the courts have a substantial interest.
E. Perils with Sources in Ourselves
Our focus shifts here to perils whose primary sources are internal to the
community of supporters of court ADR. Having already strained your
patience, I will not explore in detail any of these perils. Rather, I will simply
identify (not in order of importance) and comment briefly on each-knowing
that they have been, or will. be, subjects of thorough examination in other
settings.
1. A Generalized "Good Faith" Requirement
The first such peril arises from the temptation to impose on parties and
their lawyers a 'generalized requirement to participate in "good faith" in our
ADR processes. 125 Of course, external constituencies (most obviously
legislatures) also could be a source of this peril. However imposed, such a
requirement could do considerable damage without yielding sufficient
offsetting benefits.
We note at the outset that we are aware of no evidence that there is much
participation in "bad faith" in court ADR. So the problem at which a
requirement of good faith would be aimed appears small, at worst.
In sharp contrast, the problems that imposing such a requirement and
trying seriously to enforce it126 would generate are considerable. Except with
respect to very specific kinds of conduct, like not showing up for the ADR
event or not submitting required papers in advance127 (problems that can be
addressed quite effectively through specific proscriptions), "good faith" is an
elastic, vague concept whose content can vary dramatically in the eyes of
different beholders. Attempting to hold parties to a poorly defined
125 For deeper treatment of considerations that should inform this debate, see John
Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in
Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2002)
(suggesting less risky means to achieve some of the ends that are being pursued by
proponents of imposing a generalized "good-faith" requirement); Kimberlee K. Kovach,
Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S.
TEX. L. REV. 575 (1997) (offering considered support for imposing such a requirement).
126 It is generally not considered healthy for courts to adopt rules they will not
seriously enforce.
127 See, e.g., Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061-63 (E.D. Mo.
2000).
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requirement can breed fear, resentment, and a sense that the court is being
unfair.
A broad definition of "good faith" participation also would intensify
risks of invasions by mediators of spheres protected by work product law-
invasions that could intensify resentments and discourage voluntary
participation in court programs. 128 Moreover, imposing a good faith
requirement could distort the role of the ADR neutral, especially for
mediators. This could happen by converting the mediator, in part, into a
"judge" of the quality of the parties and lawyers' participation. Such a
requirement also could increase the occasions for neutrals reporting to the
court about the content of, mediations, thus intensifying parties' concerns
about the reality of promises of confidentiality.
Concerns about such matters could distort the way the parties participate
in mediations, causing them to fear rather than trust the neutral, perhaps even
increasing the temptation they feel to try to manipulate the neutral into
becoming, in effect, their agent. Finally, a formal, rule-imposed good faith
requirement also might increase the incidence of motions for sanctions, either
as tactical maneuvers or simply as a result of one side misunderstanding what
underlies an opponent's conduct during the ADR event. An intensified risk
of motions for sanctions could, in turn, foster distrust across party lines,
causing parties to retreat into formality and caution, exactly the opposite
kinds of behaviors deemed essential to the success and distinctiveness of
mediation.
2. Degeneration of Process Differentiation
Like the imposition of a generalized good faith requirement, the
devolution of court ADR programs into one hybrid but largely evaluative
process could have several dangerous consequences. The risk of such a
devolution occurring is real, especially in court-connected programs, where
ADR always occurs within the context of pending (or at least threatened)
litigation. We have learned that participants in mediation often pressure
neutrals to provide substantive analytical input.129 Even if the process being
offered is intended to take the form of purely facilitative mediation, the
neutrals often are drawn into an evaluative mode, at least in some portions of
128 See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 838 F.2d 884, 887-88 (7th Cir. 1987);
Dayton, supra note 80, at 935-37.
129 See Wissler, supra note 14, at 684-85 (reporting generally more positive
participant views of mediation when the neutral offered assessments of the merits of the
parties' positions). The view that movement toward a hybrid form of mediation is both
inevitable and positive is well articulated in Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the
Eclectic: Liberating ADRfrom Ideology, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 247.
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the ADR event. We also have learned that parties to early neutral evaluations
in our court often want the neutral to help facilitate settlement negotiations.
There can be pressure on our evaluators to convert ENE into what becomes,
essentially, an evaluative mediation.
In my view, it would be a serious policy mistake to permit such
pressures, or poor training and quality control, to blur lines of distinction
between ADR processes. 130 If we fail to maintain clear differences between
processes and permit all court ADR to become some blur of evaluative
mediation and a settlement conference we will needlessly compromise our
ability to be responsive to the full range of values and needs that litigants
bring to our courts. We will reduce the occasions on which parties perceive
the court as reaching out to them, trying to help them pursue the goals that
are most important to them. Offering only an evaluative form of ADR also
could increase the risk of parties inferring that the courts' only real interest in
the program is getting cases settled, thus reducing occasions for parties to
feel grateful to the court for providing a party-oriented service. Moreover, the
more that "evaluation" pervades an ADR process, the greater the risk of the
"litigization" of that process, which in turn, reduces the capacity of ADR to
contribute in unique ways to problem solving.131
Relying on a single blended process that includes both evaluative and
facilitative techniques risks corrupting both mediation and evaluation. In the
eyes of many, mediation has a special contribution to make only when the
neutral encourages a broader and deeper sweep of inquiry and leaves the
"evaluating" to the other participants in the process. The capacity to tap the
potential of non-evaluative mediation processes would be lost if court
programs encouraged or recognized only forms of mediation with a
substantial evaluative component. Similarly, a blended approach would
endanger one of the principal advantages of ENE: the confidence that each
participant can have, because of the design of the process, that he or she
knows all the input that the neutral has received from the parties and their
lawyers before the neutral produces his or her evaluation. In mediations and
settlement conferences, by contrast, the use of private caucusing prevents
parties from knowing everything the other participants have told the neutral,
which can undermine confidence in both what the basis is for the neutral's
"evaluation" and in its impartiality.
130 See also Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of
Processes, Rather Than One Eclectic Process, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 295, 296-97 (2000).
131 For more development of this concern, see Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the
Conversation About the Current Status and the Future of ADR: A View from the Courts,
2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 11, 29.
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Permitting distinct processes to devolve into one largely evaluative but
malleable hybrid also would compromise courts' ability to develop coherent
and teachable process protocols and to establish straightforward and
consistent ethical guidelines that neutrals could learn and follow with
confidence. These difficulties would impair both training of neutrals and
quality control.
The more like a smorgasbord an ADR process becomes, the greater the
risk that the neutral will make poor judgments about which process route to
follow or which techniques are appropriate. As these risks increase, so does
the likelihood that neutrals in the same court program, hosting what is
nominally the same kind of ADR process, would use different procedures in
similar circumstances. If neutrals in the same program use different
procedures and techniques in parallel settings, it becomes appreciably more
difficult for parties and lawyers to predict what will occur in any particular
ADR event.
As predictability of process declines, so does the parties' ability to
prepare adequately, which not only jeopardizes the usefulness of the ADR
event but also increases the risk that parties will feel that the program is
unfair. Parties are more likely to be resentful when they encounter turns in
the process which they did not anticipate. Turns in process that parties do not
anticipate are more likely to be viewed as inconsistent with the court's rules
and of dubious propriety, or as offending deeply rooted feelings about what
the appropriate roles of lawyers, clients, and the court are. 132 An ADR
program that spawned resentment toward the court, instead of gratitude,
could hardly be considered an improvement in the administration of justice.
3. Program Rigidification
The prospect of ADR program rigidification raises two primary
concerns. The first is the possibility that the way we institutionalize ADR
programs could encourage, both in parties and counsel, dependency,
complacency, and passivity about ADR (in particular) and settlement (in
general). We need to design into our systems incentives and prods that will
discourage litigants from simply sitting back and waiting for the ADR
service that the court offers or compels. We must look for ways to encourage
litigants to take the initiative to pursue settlement earlier and on their own.
132 For example, lawyers (and sometimes clients) are likely to be taken aback if a
neutral pushes to meet privately with a party without his counsel, or seems set on
displacing counsel by aggressively criticizing his analysis or approach.
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The second, related concern is to avoid kinds of program rigidity in
which routine referrals to ADR discourage or replace case-specific dialogue
about ADR with a judge or a staff professional. 133 There is a growth curve in
the history of ADR in most jurisdictions. Early in that history, before the
local bar andlitigant groups have developed a substantial appreciation for the
benefits that ADR has to offer, courts may need to push litigants into ADR
experiences. At some point, the angle of that learning curve will decline
substantially and it is at that point that we need to be sure that our systems do
not thoughtlessly force parties into ADR when it would likely not be
productive for them. To do so discredits the court and makes its motives look
institutionally selfish. In contrast, by engaging in real, open minded dialogue
with litigants to determine .what they need and whether there is a real
prospect that they would benefit from a referral to ADR the court encourages
respect for itself and a perception that it understands itself as fundamentally a
service institution.Moreover, if'our rules and practices make ADR easier (and less
expensive) to fake than to escape, we risk corrupting and de-valuing ADR.
Parties who feel forced into ADR when it has little to offer them are more
likely just to go through the motions and to be perceived by the neutrals and
other parties as so doing. Such rituals without real prospect of reward can
erode the public's confidence in both the court and in ADR, and foreseeable
bad experiences with ADR are not likely to encourage parties to consider its
use when it really could deliver value.
4. Overestimating ADR's Contribution
Another peril with an internal source is that we will assess ADR program
value with myopic self-congratulation or through ideological filters rather
than with an accurate understanding of what our programs really are
delivering and a square acknowledgment of their limitations. One source of
this concern is a pattern I have noticed in responses to some surveys that ask
parties, lawyers, and neutrals to report what occurred at an ADR session and
to assess the contributions the ADR process made. In this pattern, which is
reflected in surveys as disparate as those undertaken as part of the RAND
study of ADR in six federal district courts in the first half of the 1990s134 and
133 Sharon Press, Director of the Dispute Resolution Center in the Office of the State
Courts Administrator in Tallahassee, Florida, sensitized me to the risks described in this
section. She has become concerned that in some cases lawyers may accurately determine
that ADR will yield no significant benefit to their case, but decide to go through the ADR
motions anyway because they believe the court would not excuse them from participation
even if they made a detailed and good faith showing in support of such a request.
134 KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 13, at 24, 44, 47-48.
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those we conduct on an ongoing basis in the Northern District of California,
the reports from the, neutrals are consistently much more favorable than the
reports from the lawyers or the parties. The lawyers usually are at least a
little more positive than the parties, but often the gap is greater between the
neutrals and the other participants.
Results of recently completed surveys in the Northern District of
California are illustrative. 135 When asked whether the mediation in their
particular case helped the parties bridge a communication gap, the
affirmative response rates were 22% for parties, 19% for lawyers who
represented parties in the mediations, but 47% for the mediators. When asked
whether the mediation clarified or narrowed issues; 71% of the mediators
said yes, while only 35% of the lawyers shared that view (our instrument did
not pose this question to clients). There were similar substantial
discrepancies in views about whether the mediation had included discussion
of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the parties' legal positions: 86%
of the responding mediators reported that such substantive discussions
occurred, but that view was shared by only 66% of the responding lawyers
and only about half of the litigants.
This pattern of pronounced differences between the perceptions of
mediators and the perceptions of lawyers and litigants should prompt us to
ask some serious questions of ourselves and to launch substantial efforts to
answer them. Are we, in the mediation community, self delusional? Is
ideology, or the need for self-justification, distorting our vision? Are we
giving ourselves credit for contributions that are only at the margins of the
case or of the parties' concerns and that do not matter much to parties and
lawyers? Or are these differences in perceptions attributable to our failures to
teach, to help parties and lawyers understand what they actually are
accomplishing during our mediations? Even if our perceptions are accurate
and theirs are not (I seriously doubt that the differences can be explained
solely on this basis), we disserve our craft and our programs if we are not
educating the people we serve to appreciate all the different things they
accomplish through their mediations.
135 Survey results on file with the author and the ADR unit in the Northern District
of California. It is important to emphasize that the return rates on the questionnaires from
which the data in the text are taken was quite low for parties (25%) and for lawyers who
represented parties in mediations (35%), while the return rate for mediators was much
higher (67%). It is possible that the differences in response patterns reported in the text
are attributable, in some measure at least, to the differences in response rates. While
RAND also reported substantial differences in response rates (11% for parties, 45% for
lawyers representing parties in ADR events,. and 67% for neutrals), it seems unlikely that
these differentials are sufficient to explain the parallel patterns, given their consistency
across such diverse programs and in response to so many different questions. KAKALIK ET
AL., supra note 13, at 24.
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At the same time, we also must take great care to avoid the perils that we
would create if we were to promise our constituencies or ourselves that our
ADR programs will deliver more than they can. Creating unrealistic
expectations would unnecessarily invite judgments under inappropriate
standards, thus both jeopardizing appreciation for what the programs are in
fact accomplishing and generating falsely premised disappointment and
disaffection. We increase the risk that both our constituents and we will turn
away from this work if we succumb to the temptation to claim too much.
As important, inflated expectations or promises could tempt us to cut
process or program design corners that could compromise values that are
essential to public confidence both in ADR and in the court system. If we
promise "results" as measured by specified effects on the courts' dockets, for
example, we will feel pressure to increase settlement rates-and that pressure
could lead us to pressure our neutrals to elevate ends over means or to insist
on using only one assertively evaluative approach even when parties would
be comfortable only with a purely facilitative process. Or if we strain our
resources to try to serve the greatest possible number of cases we take serious
risks with quality control and thus with the character of the work done in the
courts' name. So we must discipline ourselves to abjure the temptations that
beset unbridled enthusiasts. Ours is not a movement rooted in unconditional
faith, but simply an effort to better serve.
5. Underestimating the Importance of What We Are Trying to Do
The temptation to over-promise, however, may not be the greatest peril
with an internal source. Ironically, that peril could well be underestimating
the importance of what we are trying to do.
Even with expectations firmly rooted in reality, we will experience
disappointments. We will make mistakes-in policy, in program design, in
training, in administration, in response to problems. There will be occasions
in which our neutrals perform poorly or even violate principals we hold dear.
There will be occasions in which lawyers or parties abuse our processes or
fail, completely, to understand or respect the spirit in which we try to work
for them. There are people, not in insignificant numbers, who are not
animated by values or interests that we respect and whose conduct will not
change regardless of the process setting.
There are many more people, however, who will understand and
appreciate the spirit that drives our service and who will find real value in
what we do. It is for that reason that adding substantial ADR services to the
pretrial process-and thereby reaching out to litigants, encouraging them to
decide which interests are most important to them, permitting them to choose
or fashion a procedure that is tailored to pursue those interests and that offers
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them an opportunity to reclaim power over and responsibility for how their
dispute is resolved-might just be the greatest single reform in the history of
this country's judicial institutions.
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